

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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Russian and American Civil Wars, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i>	203
John Ledyard and the 'Russians, <i>Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov</i>	211
Reminiscences of the Moscow Students' Movement, <i>Ivan Kheraskov</i>	223
Soviet Jurisprudence Since World War II, <i>N. S. Timasheff</i>	233
Pobedonostsev's Thought Control, <i>Arthur E. Adams</i>	241

BOOK REVIEWS

Communism in Western Europe, <i>by M. Einaudi, J.-M. Domenach, A. Garosci; Stalin's Satellites in Europe, by Y. Gluckstein, F. Lee Bennis</i>	247
The Russian Revolution, <i>by W. H. Chamberlin, Dimitri von Mohrenschildt</i>	250
Russia, Past and Present, <i>by A. G. Mazour, C. E. Black</i>	252

Continued on Page II

How Strong is Russia?, by T. Zavalani, <i>Warren B. Walsh</i>	254
Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, by B. I. Schwartz, <i>Wilfred J. Smith</i>	255
<i>Na putiakh k svobode</i> (On the Road to Freedom), by A. Tyrkova-Williams, <i>B. P. Vycheslavzeff</i>	257
<hr/>	
Index to Volume 11	259

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Russian and American Civil Wars

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE Civil War that went on in Russia with varying degrees of intensity from the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in November, 1917, until the suppression of the Kronstadt revolt and the gradual elimination of peasant guerrilla resistance in 1921 has been almost forgotten in the United States. There is a considerable historical literature on the subject in Russian, written both from the Red and the White standpoints.

A few histories and books of memoirs have been translated into English. But to most Americans the outline of the Russian Civil War is dim and faded. This is unfortunate, because several valuable historical and political lessons may be drawn from this first great victory of international Communism.

First, it is noteworthy that Communism was not accepted enthusiastically, or even passively. The Soviet government only established its power after fighting a very fierce and implacable war, after mobilizing millions of men into the Red Army, after building up a tremendous apparatus of police terror.

Second, and this is a point of some topical importance, while the strongest military resistance to the Soviet régime was led by Russians, animated by patriotic, nationalist, and conservative sentiments, the most intense popular resistance was to be found in areas of the former Russian Empire where the majority of the people were non-Russian. This is especially true as regards the Ukraine, most of the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This same observation holds good for the new nations which established independent existence, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland.

Third, Communist political tactics during the Civil War were a preview of the tactics which were subsequently employed both in consolidating power in Russia and in extending that power over large areas of Europe and Asia during and after the Second World War. As often happens with doctrinaire fanatics, convinced of the rightness and inevitability of their ultimate end, the Soviet leaders showed themselves shrewd, realistic, and utterly unscrupulous in their immediate means.

They would give any number of false promises; they often made temporary coalitions with groups which they proposed, in the end,

to destroy. They used the jujitsu methods which have been very characteristic of Stalin's foreign policy in more recent years. Jujitsu, it may be noted, is a Japanese art of self-defense in which the opponent is induced, by various sleight-of-hand tricks, to throw himself by his own weight. The Soviet government exploited to the utmost the fission between the Russian and non-Russian elements in opposition, soothing the non-Russians with promises of autonomy or even independence which there was no intention of keeping. The Communists also proved expert in taking advantage of every weakness, every failure of the Whites in the field of political and economic reconstruction.

The final Communist victory was a product not so much of Soviet strength as of White weakness. This is how Stalin likes to win victories in the arena of international politics. The two masterpieces of Stalin's diplomacy were the pact with Hitler, which gave the Soviet Union some twenty-four million new subjects and a considerable accession of territory with a minimum expenditure of blood, and the acquisition of a controlling position in the Far East at the cheap price of a few days of token warfare with a collapsing Japan.

The Russian Civil War suggests several points of similarity, and other points of contrast with the American Civil War, which many Southerners still prefer to call the War Between the States. Both were large-scale conflicts, extending over vast areas and profoundly affecting the future destinies of the Russian and American peoples.

The two sides in both civil wars started almost from scratch in building up regular armed forces. Russia was in a state of profound military disorganization, following the greatest mutiny in history, when the huge Russian army simply melted away and streamed homeward in the summer and autumn of 1917, as a consequence of the complete breakdown of military discipline and state authority. The United States, unlike Russia, had no tradition of a large standing army or of military conscription. The first armies of the American Civil War were largely composed of raw recruits, many of the officers knowing little more than the men. In years of struggle these armies developed into the battle-hardened veteran forces which fought out the last grim campaigns in Virginia under Grant and Lee.

In the American Civil War the cleavage was clearly geographical, the Northern states against the Southern states, with a fringe of border states (Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, for instance) where sympathy was divided. There was an enclave of Union sympathizers in the South, in the mountainous region of Eastern Tennessee

and there were Southern sympathizers in the North. But in the main, and with the exception of certain regions where sympathy was divided and where there was guerrilla warfare, Lincoln could count on the loyalty of the North and Jefferson Davis on the loyalty of the South. The American Civil War was fought very much as a conflict between two separate nations, with some added element of "fifth column" activity on both sides of the fighting lines.

In Russia also there was a North-South cleavage. The area which remained constantly under Soviet rule was the northern and central part of European Russia. In this area were the two largest cities, Moscow and Petrograd, and a fairly homogeneous Russian population.

The most formidable military effort of the Whites came from the South and was represented by the Volunteer Army of General Denikin. The hard core of this army was composed of irreconcilable former officers of the Imperial Army, who in some cases, in the beginning of the struggle, formed whole units themselves, such as the famous Markov and Drozdovsky regiments.

This force, later renamed the Armed Forces of South Russia, swelled considerably in size in the first months of 1919 as the Kuban and Don Cossack regions, in the Southeast, rose in rebellion against Soviet requisitions and persecution of religion. By October, 1919, at the time of his greatest success, Denikin's vanguard was beyond Orel, within 175 miles of Moscow, and the Red Army had been driven from the Ukraine. The Whites then held all the main cities of South Russia, while the countryside was an uneasy no man's land, in which marauding local bands, with or without political coloration, were the most effective power.

The largest and perhaps most decisive campaigns of the Civil War took place in the last months of 1919, when Denikin's armies, spread out too thinly over too wide a territory, collapsed, as much from internal discontent and friction as from the strength of the Red Army. By the spring of 1920 the territory under White rule had shrunk to the Crimean peninsula, where General Baron Peter Wrangel put up the last organized stand of Old Russia. Wrangel was defeated and forced to evacuate his forces in November, 1920.

Another common feature of the two civil wars was the widespread and effective use of cavalry. The Cossacks were superb natural horsemen, with centuries of tradition as the crack cavalry of the Imperial Russian Army. The dashing raids of Wrangel, himself a

cavalry officer, Mamontov, and Shkuro contributed much to Denikin's spectacular territorial gains.

Cavalry also played a considerable part in some of the successes of the Confederates. Southern plantation life made for good riding and such Confederate Generals as Jeb Stuart, Forrest, and Morgan displayed a genius for the quick raid that would wreck a railway, raid a munitions or clothing center, or collect valuable information. Morgan's dash across Union territory north of the Ohio River suggests a comparison with Mamontov's sweeping raid behind the Red lines deep into Soviet territory in the early autumn of 1919.

In each case the side that was ultimately to lose the war was the first to develop proficiency in the use of cavalry. And the Red Army, like the North, finally developed cavalry forces superior to those of its opponent.

Trotsky, Commissar for War during the years of civil conflict, published a famous appeal: "Proletarians, to Horse!," under the provocative stimulus of the Mamontov raid. Probably few authentic proletarians took to horseback riding. But the Red Army Command succeeded in building up powerful cavalry armies, largely recruited among the minority of Cossacks who took the Red side and among the so-called *inogorodnii* (outlanders), non-Cossack peasants in the Southeast whose antagonism to the Cossacks was cleverly exploited by the few local Communists.

These armies, led by a former Tsarist sergeant-major, Semyon Budenny, the Ukrainian Primakov, and another chieftain named Zhloba, finally overcame the crumbling Whites and repeated, in reverse, the raids which the White cavalry carried out behind the Red lines. In the same way, Sheridan, Custer, and other Union cavalry leaders played havoc with the Confederate rear and lines of communication in the last phase of the Civil War.

Both in Russia and in America the heaviest battalions, using that expression in its broadest sense, prevailed. The superiority of the North to the South both in manpower and in industrial resources almost predetermined the issue of the Civil War. Grant's final relentless pounding campaigns were based on a theory of attrition, on the knowledge that the Confederacy was at its last gasp in manpower, whereas Union reserves were still substantial.

The same pattern was repeated in the Russian Civil War. At all times the Soviet government had a larger population to mobilize and more troops on the fronts. Most of the munitions factories were in Soviet territory; a factor which considerably outweighed the limited

and sporadic aid which the Whites received from abroad. Another important advantage of the Red Army was the possession of interior lines of communication. The principal White armies, those of Denikin in the South, of Kolchak in the East, the smaller forces of Yudenitch in the neighborhood of Petrograd, and Miller in the North, were separated from each other by thousands of miles. The Red Army Command was able to move troops as they might be needed to the most critical point. Unlike the separated White areas, the Confederacy in the beginning was a solid mass of contiguous territory. But it was gradually cut to pieces, first by Northern domination of the Mississippi River, then by Sherman's drive to the sea through Georgia.

If there are a number of superficial similarities between the American and Russian Civil Wars, the contrasts are more numerous and deeper. Most striking and probably most important of these contrasts was the incomparably more uncompromising and ferocious nature of the struggle in Russia.

The Civil War inflicted deep scars upon American unity. The destruction that accompanied Sherman's march to the sea and Sheridan's devastation of the Shenandoah Valley are still bitter memories in the regions affected. But the fiercest acts committed by either side in the struggle fall far short of the horrors of systematic Red and White terror, or of the tremendous pogroms against the Jews (infinitely worse and more extensive than any that took place under the Tsarist government) which took place in the Ukraine.

Despite the folly and vindictiveness of the so-called Reconstruction Period, the United States gradually became one country again in patriotism, ideals, and common loyalty. There was no bloody proscription of the vanquished. General Lee became the revered President of a university which still commemorates his name; Jefferson Davis, after a short period of imprisonment, was able to compose his history of the Confederacy; very few Southerners quit the country.

For the Russian Whites, on the other hand, defeat meant in many cases summary execution, to which the alternative was often life-long exile from their native country. There was no reconciliation, such as occurred in the United States. No doubt many former Whites, in time, found their way into Soviet service; but they could never be free from the lurking fear that their past would make them the first victims of the newest purge.

While the American Civil War was, in the main, a struggle be-

tween two sections of the country, in which there was little element of class struggle, Lenin had proclaimed the Bolshevik Revolution as one of relentless class-war; and Soviet actions matched Soviet theory. Consequently the line of cleavage in the Russian struggle was horizontal, the poor against the middle class and the aristocracy, not vertical, a war of one section against another.

A natural consequence was that the armies and the fronts on both sides were much less stable than those of the Union and the Confederacy. There were no gigantic battles in the Russian Civil War, no Gettysburgs, Shilohs, Chancellorsvilles. But mutinies and desertions were much more frequent, and there were far more flare-ups of revolt in the rear.

All sense of firm state authority had been destroyed by the tremendous upheaval of 1917. The old régime was destroyed, and the White's attempts to restore its institutions or to set anything in their place were not successful. The new Soviet régime was still to a large part of the people a dubious experiment and the Soviets, under the pressure of Civil War, soon lost all independence and became mere organs of administration for the Communist Party, an organization which at that time numbered several hundred thousand members.

In view of these circumstances, the mood of what was then the large peasant majority of the country exerted a powerful, although negative outcome on the issue of the war. The peasants were divided among themselves, with the poorer inclining toward the Soviets and the more well-to-do regarding the Whites as the lesser evil.

The majority of the peasants undoubtedly disliked certain features both of Red and of White rule. They did not like the Communist requisitions of their surplus produce, without giving anything in return, or the Soviet anti-religious attitude. But they did not want the landlords to come back and they feared a restoration of the old régime which would mean loss of the land which they had seized and probably stern retribution for the excesses of 1917.

One of the most important reasons for the final victory of the Soviets in the Civil War was that the Communists, as a general rule, were more adept in propagandizing, organizing, and regimenting the peasants than were the Whites. Perhaps a psychological key to this success is to be found in the analysis of the mood of the peasants by a shrewd White observer in Siberia:

"Reds and Whites are both scoundrels. But the Reds are our kind of scoundrels. The Whites are alien scoundrels."

Out of the confused chronicle of the Russian war one can discern three periods of extreme crisis, when the very existence of the Soviet régime was threatened. One of these was in August, 1918. Soviet territory at this time had shrunk almost to the proportions of the medieval grand duchy of Moscow. The Germans were in the Ukraine, the White General Krasnov in the Don Territory; Siberia and most of the region east of the Volga had been lost as a result of the intervention of the Czecho-Slovak Legionnaires, supported by discontented Russians. Kazan, on the Volga, had fallen to an army which was fighting in the name of the dissolved Constituent Assembly. There were starvation conditions in Moscow and other large cities; the villages were rent with fierce fights over requisitions of the peasants' grain.

A very small push would have upset the Soviet régime at this time; but the small push was not forthcoming. Trotsky, by a combination of inspirational oratory and such ruthless measures as the shooting of every tenth man in retreating units, whipped the raw recruits of the Red Army into a fighting force. The collapse of Germany in the autumn broke the iron ring around the Soviet Republic for the time being.

The second great crisis occurred in the autumn of 1919, when Denikin was at Orel and another White General, Yudenitch, reached the suburbs of Petrograd. But the Red fronts held. Once Denikin's forces began to retreat the whole very fragile political order set up by the Whites rapidly crumbled. The principal leaders of the anti-Bolshevik military movement, Denikin and Kolchak, were defeated by the end of 1919, although Wrangel held out in the Crimea until November, 1920.

The third crisis occurred in March, 1921, when the sailors and workers in the fortress of Kronstadt, near Petrograd, rebelled, calling for free Soviets and an abolition of special privileges for Communists and high Soviet officials. Overt military opposition had been crushed, but the Kronstadt uprising was an acute symptom of the mood of profound discontent among the very masses in whom the Communists professed to see their main support. The Kronstadt revolt and scattered peasant uprisings, especially severe in Western Siberia, parts of the Ukraine and Tambov Province, were put down and the causes of peasant discontent were alleviated by the introduction of the New Economic Policy, which legalized freedom of internal trade and substituted a fixed tax for the arbitrary requisitions.

Old soldiers like to discuss old campaigns. No doubt veterans of the White armies sometimes discuss whether the Civil War could have ended differently. If Denikin had concentrated all his forces on one big drive along the main railway to Moscow, instead of spreading out so widely in the Ukraine. . . . If the western powers had supported Kolchak and Denikin as vigorously as Germany and Italy supported Franco. . . . If Poland had launched its attack on the Soviet Union when Denikin's drive was at its height, not after the White armies had been defeated. . . . If, if, if . . . No doubt veterans of the Confederacy occupied some of their spare time in the postwar years with similar reflections.

But the most reasonable historical judgment seems to be that the outcome of both American and Russian Civil Wars was determined by a whole combination of political, economic, social and military causes, not by any single decisive battle or conspicuous success or blunder of strategy.

John Ledyard and the Russians*

BY EUFROSINA DVOICHENKO-MARKOV

In Russia I am treated as an American with politeness and respect and on my account the healths of Dr. Franklin and General Washington have been drunk at the tables of two Governors; and at Irkutsk the name of Adams has found its way.

J. Ledyard to Colonel Smith, 1787

IN the spring of 1776, the celebrated Captain Cook sailed from England for his third and last expedition. This time he had to explore the North Pacific and to find a northern passage to Europe. The commander's ship, the *Resolution*, had among its officers a young corporal from Connecticut, John Ledyard.

Since the sixteenth century the world had been anxious to find out whether America was really divided from Asia by a passage and whether communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans through this passage was possible. The accounts of the Russian expeditions remained unpublished. Spain, as well as Russia, preferred to keep the results of their explorations in the Pacific a well-guarded secret; both countries feared that otherwise the Pacific might be invaded by a horde of foreign adventurers. The urge to discover a Northwest Passage was especially strong in England. During Cook's third expedition, rewards were offered "to such of his Majesty's subjects as shall first discover a communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean in the Northern hemisphere."¹

Cook's third expedition was also to bring the young United States into the Pacific for the first time, in the person of John Ledyard, who later became the author of the project of the first American expedition to the Pacific. It was also in the person of Ledyard that America for the first time met Russia in the Pacific.

When, in June, 1778, Cook's expedition reached the Aleutian Islands, some natives brought to one of the ships a letter written in Russian. Although Cook "could not decypher the alphabet of the writer," he understood that others had preceded him "in visiting this dreary part of the globe."² The presence of the Russians in this re-

*This article is part of the author's forthcoming book: *Early American-Russian Cultural Relations* [Ed.].

¹James Cook, *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean* . . . , 1784, Vol. 2, p. 15.

²*Ibid.*, p. 414. The Aleutian Islands were discovered by the Russians in 1741.

gion was marked also by blue linen shirts and drawers among the natives of the islands. "But the most remarkable circumstance was a cake of rye meal newly baked with a piece of salmon in it, seasoned with peper and salt, which was brought and presented to Cook by a comely young chief attended by two of those Indians, whom we supposed to be Asiatics," wrote Ledyard in his *Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage*.³ These Indians from the Aleutian Islands tried to explain to the expedition that there were some white men on their island. Cook decided to send with them to their island Ledyard, who, as an American and a student from Dartmouth College, knew Indian dialects and habits. In his book Ledyard described his first meeting with the Russians on the Aleutian Islands in October, 1778. The Indians took him to the interior of the island. It was during the night when they reached a village. Ledyard was introduced into a house inhabited by Europeans. They were "light and comely" and from their appearance the American concluded that they were Russians. Ledyard wrote:

As I was much fatigued, wet and cold, I had a change of garments brought to me, consisting of a blue silk shirt and drawers, a fur cap, boots, and gown, all which I put on with the same cheerfulness they were presented with. . . . All the Russians in the house sat down round me. One of the company gave me to understand, that all the white people I saw there were subjects of the Empress Catherine of Russia. . . . I had a very comfortable bed composed of different skins. After I had lain down, the Russians assembled the Indians in a very silent manner, and said prayers after the manner of the Greek Church. I could not but observe with what particular satisfaction the Indians performed their devoirs to God through the medium of their little crucifixes, and with what pleasure they went through the multitude of ceremonies attendant on that sort of worship. . . . As soon as I was up, I was conducted to a hut, where I saw a number of platforms. . . . Several Indians were heating water in a large copper caldron. I soon understood this was a hot bath, of which I was asked to make use in a friendly manner. The apparatus being a little curious, I consented to it, but before I had finished undressing myself, I was overcome by the sudden change of the air, fainted away, and fell back on the platform. I was, however, soon relieved by having cold and luke-warm water administered to my face and different parts of my body.⁴

After having investigated "how those Russian adventurers were situated," on the island, Ledyard returned to the ship bringing with him three Russians. With them and another Russian fur trader, Gherasim Ismailov, who arrived a few days later, Cook was able to exchange some information about the North Pacific by sign language

³Hartford, 1783, p. 90.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 94-96.

and with the help of charts, brought by Ismailov, which he allowed Cook to copy. Cook entrusted Ismailov with dispatches to the Admiralty in London to be sent through Kamchatka or Okhotsk. Ledyard, who supposed Siberia to be a wild country, was surprised to learn that there was a system of communication with Europe.

The Russian penetration so far into the Pacific and so close to the American northwestern shores, which Ledyard considered should belong geographically to his country, impressed him so deeply that after his return home from Cook's expedition, he decided to organize an American trade expedition to the Pacific. But Ledyard was unable to achieve his purpose in America. His enterprise seemed to the American merchants "wild and visionary." Consequently, Ledyard decided to go to Europe, hoping to find the backers for a fur-trading expedition to the northwest coast.

In Paris Ledyard visited Thomas Jefferson, who was then American Ambassador to France. A wish to explore the great West had long been Jefferson's favorite hobby. His dream was realized twenty years later, when Congress gave him the authority to send the famous Lewis and Clark expedition overland to the Pacific, but the first attempt to explore the western part of northern America was made by him in 1785.

During that year Jefferson proposed to Ledyard, instead of a commercial enterprise, a scientific expedition of exploration. He was to go "by land to Kamchatka, cross in . . . the Russian vessels to Nootka Sound, fall down into the latitude of the Missouri and penetrate to and through that to the United States."⁵ Jefferson also wanted Ledyard to make anthropological observations in Siberia in order to prove the similarity of the Asiatic natives to the American Indians, and to uphold in this way the theory that Asia and America were one continent. He wrote to Ezra Stiles in 1786: "I suppose, the settlement of our continent is of the most remote antiquity. The similitude between its inhabitants and those of Eastern parts of Asia renders it probable that ours are descended from them or theirs from ours."⁶

The bold attempt to reach western America through Siberia was impossible without special permission from the Russian government. Jefferson knew personally the Russian Minister at Paris, Simoulin. He was also well acquainted with a more important person, the well-known agent and correspondent of the Russian Empress, Baron de

⁵*The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 1892, Vol. I, pp. 94-96.

⁶*Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 298-299.

Grimm. According to Jefferson's own statement, Simoulin and Grimm solicited the permission of the Empress for Ledyard to pass through the Russian dominions to the western coast of America.

At that time, a Russian naval expedition under the command of Captain Joseph Billings, former seaman of Captain Cook, was to be sent by Catherine the Great "to complete the geographical knowledge of the most distant possessions of that Empire, and of such northern parts of the opposite continent as Captain Cook could not possibly ascertain."⁷ From the answer of the Russian Empress to Grimm one can assume that he proposed that Ledyard should take part in this expedition. Catherine wrote on June 17, 1786:

M. Ledyard fera bien de prendre un autre chemin que celui du Kamtchatka, parce que pour cette expédition il n'y a plus le moyen de l'atteindre. Au reste, tout ce qu'on a publié de cette expédition est parfaitement faux et un rêve creux: jamais il n'y a eu de compagnie ambulante, et tout se réduit à l'expédition du capitaine Billings et d'un équipage choisi par lui et Pallas. Laissez à l'Américain l'argent que vous lui avez donné ou promis; mais ne jetez pas à l'avenir mon argent par les fenêtres: je ne connais point ces gens-là et n'ai aucune affaire jusqu'ici avec eux.⁸

Grimm probably insisted, because a month later, the Russian Empress wrote again: "Je vous ai dit tout ce que j'avais à dire sur le Sr. Ledyar[d]."

It must be noted that Catherine's attitude toward Americans cannot be judged by this letter; she later accepted John Paul Jones into her service. But her experience with Americans was not always successful. It is known that in 1778 American privateers attacked Russian commercial vessels, and in 1780 Stephen Sayre, an American pseudo-agent, tried to burn down the Russian fleet in the Baltic.⁹

Catherine's second letter to Grimm was probably received in August, because on August 16, Jefferson wrote to Ledyard: "I saw Baron de Grimm yesterday at Versailles, and he told me he had received an answer from the Empress who declines the proposition made on your account. She thinks it chimerical."¹⁰

But it was too late to stop Ledyard. It was not the first time that his project had been considered "wild and visionary." He decided

⁷M. Sauer, *An Account of a Geographical and Astronomical Expedition*, London, 1802, p. 8.

⁸*Lettres de Catherine II à Grimm*, St. Petersburg, 1878, p. 378.

⁹W. Cresson, *Francis Dana*, New York, 1930, pp. 108, 179.

¹⁰*Jefferson Papers*, Library of Congress. This letter as well as Catherine's letters to Grimm were not used by the biographers of Ledyard.

to go to Russia without any permission, only with letters of recommendation from Lafayette to his cousin and companion in the American War for Independence, Count de Ségur, who was at that time Ambassador of France at St. Petersburg.

In the fall of 1786, Ledyard left Paris and went to London, where he spent the winter, and in March, 1787, he already was writing to Jefferson from St. Petersburg:

I cannot tell you by what means I came to Petersburg, and hardly know by what means I shall quit it, in the further prosecution of my tour round the world by land. If I have any merit in the affair, it is perseverance, for most severely have I been buffeted; and yet still am even more obstinate than before. . . . How the matter will terminate I know not.¹¹

When Ledyard arrived in St. Petersburg, which he called "this Aurora Borealis of a city,"¹² the Russian Empress was on a trip to the Crimea, together with her court and the foreign diplomatic corps. Ledyard probably had letters of introduction from London to the Russian academician, the famous naturalist, Simon Pallas, whom he visited in St. Petersburg.¹³ Pallas helped Ledyard to obtain a passport from the French Embassy. Strangely enough, Ledyard was also helped in this affair by an officer from the suite of Grand Duke Paul.¹⁴ The transportation to Siberia had also been arranged by Pallas. The first part of the trip, to Barnaul, across the Urals, Ledyard made in the Russian stage coach, called *kibitka*, with a young Scottish physician, William Braun, a member of Billings' expedition, who was returning to his post with some additional equipment for the expedition.¹⁵

Ledyard continued his anthropological research in Siberia and soon deduced that America was peopled from Asia and not the other way around, which at that time was the generally accepted theory of Buffon. Thus Ledyard was the precursor of the modern anthro-

¹¹Ledyard's papers in Dartmouth College Library.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Pallas was a member of the English Royal Society and later became a member of the American Philosophical Society. In 1768-1774 he led the Russian expedition in Siberia, an account of which he published in 1771-1776.

¹⁴It is known that Grand Duke Paul was in opposition to his mother's politics and his help could arouse the suspicion of Catherine the Great.

¹⁵Ledyard wrote to Jefferson about Billings' expedition: "There is an equipment now on foot here for that ocean and it is first to visit the N. W. Coast of America. It is to consist of four ships. This, and the equipment that went from here twelve months since by land for Kamchatka, are to cooperate in a design of some sort in the Northern Pacific Ocean." H. Augur, *Passage to Glory*, New York, 1946, p. 203.

pological theory which holds that the Mongols, crossing from Siberia to the American continent, became Indians.

In the city of Barnaul, Ledyard was met with traditional Russian hospitality. The ordinary people had never heard of America and concluded from the tattoo marks on Ledyard's hands "that Americans were wild men."¹⁶ There is probably some connection between this mention of the "tattoo marks" on Ledyard's hands and the instruction given him by Jefferson: "to keep the journal of his travels by pricking it with thorn upon his skin. He had a scale of a foot marked out with Indian ink in inches and lines, upon his arm between the elbow and the wrist."¹⁷

But the educated Russians knew a great deal about America and the American Revolution from the Russian newspapers of the time, and especially from the publications of Novikov, a liberal Russian journalist, who paid great attention to events across the ocean. In Barnaul the healths of Washington and Franklin were drunk in compliment to Ledyard at the Governor's table, where he was treated with the greatest hospitality.

From Barnaul Ledyard gave to Jefferson a detailed account about the natural richness of the country and the distances from Petersburg to Barnaul and from Barnaul to Kamchatka. Then, with the help of the Governor, he got horses for a post-*kibitka* and continued his trip to Irkutsk with the mail courier.

In his Siberian diary and letters, only partly published, Ledyard gives a very interesting description of Siberia of that time, which is a valuable contribution to the history of that region in the eighteenth century. This unique early American source has remained unknown to Russian historians of Siberia.

In the letter to Colonel William Smith, the secretary of the American Legation in London, Ledyard describes Irkutsk as follows:

At this place I am in a circle as gay, rich, polite and scientific as if at Petersburg. I drink my French and Spanish wines and have Majors, Colonels, and Brigadiers, by Brigades, to wait on me in the town, and disciples of Linnaeus to accompany me in my philosophic walks. Among the middling class of people, I am a kind of phenomenon. Among the peasantry a right down wizard. The first characters know very little of our history, except the military part of it, and that they have had through the medium of some Septennial English Gazette.¹⁸

¹⁶Augur, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

¹⁷J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, 1874, Vol. 2, p. 189.

¹⁸Ledyard's papers in Dartmouth College Library.

In Irkutsk Ledyard met such persons of eighteenth-century Siberia as Governor-General Ivan Yakobi, the merchant Grigory Shelikhov, and the above-mentioned trader, Gherasim Ismailov. In his diary Ledyard describes a very interesting conversation which he had with an exiled Russian officer of French origin. The Frenchman came to Irkutsk "with terrible dread," but soon realized that the political exiles in Tsarist Siberia "are taken in as members of the community." Ledyard replied: "It occurs to me that allowed such freedom here, you are under no worse conditions than the early settlers in America." The Frenchman laughed: "We live in luxury compared to the Americans. I know, I have been in Quebec."¹⁹

In Irkutsk Ledyard also met two Russian academicians, who happened to be there, Alexander Karamyshev and Cyril (Eric) Laxman, both disciples of the celebrated Swedish scientist Linnaeus. Karamyshev helped Ledyard to mail his correspondence to Europe. He addressed Ledyard's letters to Pallas, who sent them to "Brown & Porter" in London. In this way, a good part of Ledyard's Siberian impressions was saved for posterity. Professor Karamyshev, one of the founders of Russian geology, was at that time temporarily in Siberia, serving as director of the Irkutsk Bank. Ledyard spent a great deal of time with him, engrossed in discussions about the Siberian tribes. "He is carried away with the wild notions of the French naturalist Buffon," Ledyard wrote about him. In Karamyshev's garden Ledyard saw an apple tree, the only one in Siberia, with fruit the size of big peas. For Ledyard Karamyshev got three Kalmucks in native dress so that the American guest could study them and measure their heads.

Karamyshev introduced Ledyard to General Yakobi, Governor of all Eastern Siberia, who promised to help the American traveller in his further trip to Yakutsk. Yakobi gave Ledyard a letter of recommendation to the Commandant of Yakutsk, Gregory Marklovsky. Then he wished him a successful voyage and that his travels "might be productive of information to mankind."

Yakobi introduced Ledyard to the professor of mineralogy, Laxman, who during his explorations happened to be in Irkutsk and had plans to go by way of the Pacific to visit the American shores. Now Ledyard had company to travel with him from Irkutsk to Yakutsk and even to the shores of America. He described to Colonel Smith a part of this journey as follows: "I cannot say that my voyage on

¹⁹K. Munford, *John Ledyard, an American Marco Polo*, Portland, 1939, pp. 245-246.

the Lena has furnished me with anything new, and yet no traveller ever passed by scenes that more constantly engage the heart and the imagination. I suppose no two philosophers would think alike about them. A painter and a poet would be much more likely to agree."

The villagers of Siberia were prodigal in selling them provisions for a song. In one village "they killed for us a sheep, gave us three quarts of milk, two loaves of bread, cakes with carrots and radishes baked in them, onions, a dozen of fresh and two dozens of salt fish, straw and bark to mend the covering of our boat; and all for the value of fourteen pence sterling."²⁰

When they arrived in Yakutsk, they soon realized that they have been "overtaken and arrested by winter"; Commandant Marklovsky explained to them that during the winter their journey to Okhotsk would be impracticable. He invited Ledyard and Laxman to be his guests in Yakutsk during the whole winter, assigned to them a little wooden house, gave Ledyard some warm clothing,²¹ and invited him often to dinner. In Yakutsk Ledyard continued his anthropological research for Jefferson and his correspondence through Pallas. He was not able to refrain from sending Colonel Smith some samples of the salt mined near Yakutsk and of the fossil ivory from the banks of the river Lena. He also tried to take weather observations. One day a Yakut came into the house with a bag of ice over his shoulders. Ledyard could not understand why he wanted to sell ice. But soon he realized that it was frozen milk!

In Yakutsk Ledyard was a great deal in the company of Russian traders. He wrote in his journal:

They are very interesting, hardy men. It is the most remote Russian town in the north of Siberia and on that account particularly is the resort as well as residence of those men from every known corner of that country. . . . Some had been at the mouth of the river Yenesei, others the Lena and others the Kolyma. Among them all there was hardly any place in the North or East where they had not been. They all agreed in the voluntary accounts they gave me of the great quantities of drift wood at the mouths of the Lena and Yenesei. . . . They have often asked me where I thought so much wood came from since there was none that grew on the coasts. . . . A rich intelligent merchant, Popoff, gave me also the same accounts and added also others, the result of his travels to the eastward on the American coast and also among the Kuril Islands . . . on the coast of Korea.²²

²⁰Augur, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

²¹Some of Ledyard's Siberian garments are preserved by his relatives in New England.

²²Ledyard's papers in Dartmouth College Library.

In October, 1787, Yakutsk was visited by the French traveller, Lesseps, a member of the French expedition around the world headed by La Perouse, which reached Kamchatka. Lesseps was sent by La Perouse with dispatches from Kamchatka to Paris, having the permission of the Russian government to travel across Siberia. Unfortunately, Ledyard's diary, as far as can be ascertained from available sources, does not mention this event which was so important for Yakutsk.

At the beginning of November, Captain Billings and his command arrived to spend the winter in Yakutsk. Under the date of November 24, Ledyard wrote in his journal:

The arrival of Captain Billings at Yakutsk is a circumstance that gives a turn to my affairs. I have before had no occasion to write daily. I now commence. Captain Billings is last from the Kolyma River where he has some small cutter-type built vessels in which he last summer made an attempt to pass the Shootskoi Noss. The event of this undertaking and other circumstances relative to the tour both by land and water I am yet uninformed of; perhaps some accounts will be kept secret from me, but as others will naturally transpire in the course of my acquaintance with him I shall write them as they occur.²³

A few days later Ledyard recorded: "I went to live with him at his lodgings as one of his family and his friend."

A more detailed account of Ledyard's meeting with the expedition was made by Martin Sauer, the secretary and the translator of Captain Billings. Sauer wrote:

In Yakutsk we found to our great surprise, Mr. Ledyard, an old companion of Captain Billings in Cook's voyage round the world; he then served in the capacity of a corporal, but now called himself an American Colonel, and wished to cross over to the American Continent with our Expedition, for the purpose of exploring it on foot.²⁴

By a strange coincidence, at the same time (November 26) Catherine the Great wrote to Grimm:

Vous avez eu tort, ne vous en déplaie, de rayer de mes comptes la très petite dépense de l'Américain le Dijar [Ledyard]; au reste, il est très juste que vous ayez votre pension au même temps que tous ceux qui sont hors du pays. Pour ce qui regarde le Dijar [Ledyard], ce qui fait trouvaille pour les autres, ne le fait pas toujours pour nous, vu la différence des langues, des moeurs, et des usages.²⁵

Two months later, the private secretary of the Russian Empress, A. V. Khrapovitsky, recorded in his diary under the date of De-

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Sauer, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

²⁵*Lettres de Catherine II, op. cit.*, p. 424.

ember 16: "The deportation of the American John Ledyard, who is trying to make his way from Okhotsk to America, is ordered. He was a midshipman of the celebrated Cook."²⁶

Ledyard's arrest and deportation were described in detail by Sauer, who mentions that Ledyard was accused of being a French spy. There is no primary Russian source to support this statement, yet it was used by all the biographers of Ledyard.

The majority of Ledyard's biographers were led astray by Jefferson's statement in the preface to the *Account of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*. In his preface Jefferson maintains that the permission of the Russian Empress was obtained for Ledyard through Baron de Grimm, "and an assurance of protection while the course of the voyage should be through her territories" was even granted, but only 200 miles off Kamchatka Ledyard was suddenly "arrested by an officer of the Empress, who by this time had changed her mind and forbidden his proceeding." Later, in his *Autobiography*, Jefferson recognized his error and wrote: "I find, on recurring to my letters of that date, that the Empress refused permission at once, considering the enterprise as entirely chimerical."

But the general erroneous impression of an injustice inflicted on Ledyard by a capricious Empress who could not make up her mind, has remained in the American literature on the subject. Only John Quincy Adams did not share this general impression, although he himself had a rather unpleasant experience in his youth while taking part in the unsuccessful mission of Dana to the court of Catherine the Great in 1781-1783. Adams wrote:

Ledyard undertook the journey without permission and was arrested. There was nothing in this dishonorable to the Empress Catherine who certainly acted by the advice of her counselors; who could have no personal motive for opposition to the undertaking of Ledyard, and who was individually as ambitious of philosophical fame and as eager for the progress of discovery as Mr. Jefferson himself.²⁷

An additional explanatory remark on the political situation in Russia and Siberia at that time is necessary, because it gives us a different perspective on the forces and circumstances which Ledyard had to contend with. It is known that in August, 1787, Russia was attacked by Turkey, which was supported by France, England, and Prussia. As to Siberia, Russia was still under the impact left after

²⁶A. V. Khrapovitsky, *Dnevnik*, Moscow, 1901, p. 34.

²⁷J. Q. Adams, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 310.

the famous uprising, organized by the exiled Pole Beniowski, who in 1771, under the pretext of supporting the Grand Duke Paul against Catherine the Great, fled with a group of exiled Russians from Kamchatka to France on a captured Russian ship. Later, Beniowski, supported by France and America, went to organize a colony on Madagascar, but Catherine the Great feared that knowing the way to Kamchatka he would return with the help of his protectors, and from 1771 to 1787 Russia secretly fortified Kamchatka.

From Siberia Ledyard was conveyed to Moscow and from there to the Governor-General of Byelorussia, Peter Passek, who had his headquarters at Moghilev.

General Passek, a venerable senator and a personal friend of Catherine the Great, who helped her ascent to the throne, is described by his biographers as a Russian "boyar," heavy, lazy, but very intelligent. When Ledyard arrived in Moghilev, the General was slightly indisposed, sitting up in bed, chatting with a priest. He received the American "with the most endearing politeness" and offered him some refreshments. Drinking his tea the prisoner received his sentence, which ordered that he "should be conveyed out of the Empire into Poland" and that he was forbidden "ever to enter it again without permission." Ledyard protested furiously. Then Passek "rambled off into a proverb about sovereigns having long arms." Ledyard sprang to his feet: "Yes, by God, Monsieur le Général, her arm is very long eastward, but if your Empress should stretch the other arm westward she will never bring it back whole—and I myself would fight for the privilege of lopping it off."²⁸

Ledyard remained in Moghilev five days. We don't know what happened in the interval, but Ledyard mentions the "generous solicitude" of General Passek, who gave him money, clothes and also "a servant to interpret for me, and to serve me as long as I pleased."²⁹

Ledyard left Moghilev on March 18, 1788, and that evening reached the Polish border. His escort took him to the house of a Jewish family, where he had a hot bath prepared for him. Thus, Ledyard's acquaintance with the Russians, which began in 1778 in the Aleutian Islands with a traditional Russian steam bath, ended now, ten years later, also with the same Russian bath. Ledyard wrote in his diary:

²⁸Augur, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251.

²⁹Ledyard's papers in Dartmouth College Library.

I received as a present of the Commandant of the Russian frontier village 4 bottles of a small wine of some kind and from the commanding officer of the Russian guard 6 lemons and some white bread, which was a friendly present here, where the bread is very black. . . . In the evening I contracted with a Russian trader, with the precautions of writing and signing and taking his passport in my own possession, to carry me from this place to Königsberg in Prussia for 600 versts for 40 roubles.³⁰

On March 21, Ledyard set out with his valet-courier borrowed from Passek. When he left the Russian *kibitka*, he discovered that the coachman had stolen his coat. At the same time, this Russian *yamshchik* took off his hat, bowed and asked Ledyard to remain in Russia. But the American refused to understand this complexity of Russian psychology. At that time, Dostoevsky was not yet born to explain to the world the contradictory aspects of the Russian soul. Ledyard was furious and wrote, closing his Russian diary: "Let no European put entire confidence in a Russian of whatever condition, and none at all in the lower and middle ranks of people!"³¹

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*

Reminiscences of the Moscow Students' Movement

BY IVAN KHERASKOV

THE feudal autocratic empire established by Peter the Great carried, deeply hidden within its body, the germ of a free democratic Russia. It grew and developed until the middle of the nineteenth century when, in the words of the historian Sakulin, the age "broke under the weight of historic forces" and the embryo of a free nation emerged as a living child. This was the famous "Era of the Great Reforms" which began in 1861 with the emancipation of the serfs.

Between this early spring of Russian democracy and its formal triumph in the short era of Russian parliamentarism (1905-1917), culminating in the national February revolution which abolished the Tsarist power, and the Bolshevik October revolution which plunged the country into the morass of Soviet despotism, the nation went through a quarter of a century (1881-1905) of desperate struggle between the old régime, shaken but unyielding, and the surging flood of popular unrest.

The history of this reactionary period, already pregnant, however, with a future democracy, contains a special chapter, the history of the liberation movement among university students. Throughout this period it served as an outlet, as it were, for the rebellious public mood smothered by police repression; and later, at the turn of the century, it became the forerunner of the gathering revolutionary storm.

My personal recollections relate to that final period of the movement when, having outgrown its first stage, that of the "regional fraternities," it overflowed into the broader channel of mass demonstrations which, towards 1905, became ever more political in character.

In the fall of 1897, when I first came to Moscow as a young university student, the regional fraternities, while still alive, were already declining. What alone bolstered their waning prestige among advanced student groups, was the fact that the government and the educational authorities still regarded them as a dangerous

threat to the existing order. We freshmen had dreamed of those fraternities while still in high school; to us they were a symbol of the students' struggle for freedom. Tales had reached us of a mysterious "Council of United Regional Fraternities" which stirred the romantic chords of our hearts.

Actually, however, the fraternity activities proved disappointing, at least to us, newcomers from Vladimir. The meetings were far between and rather tedious. Nothing was ever heard of the "United Council," and we new members had no idea whether our fraternity belonged to it. The day came, however, for the Council to reveal and assert itself. In February, 1899, one of the periodic student disturbances flared up, assuming, this time, national proportions.

Yet the fraternities, ours at least, played no important part in the movement, and on what grounds the organ from which it received its directions called itself the Council of Regional Fraternities, I do not know. Its membership was not recruited on a regional basis; the delegates were elected by the whole student body subdivided into "courses" according to the year of study (first-course students, second-course students and so on) and even more exactly, by accidental groupings of students of the same course. I recall how about a dozen of us, all philologists, gathered at someone's lodgings to elect substitute delegates from the four "courses" to which we belonged.

A students' strike was officially declared, but how to put it into effect on a sufficiently impressive scale was quite a problem, since not only mass meetings but even small gatherings were strictly forbidden. To find a way out, large scope was given to individual initiative. Our own group of first-course students acted as follows: we obtained a list of students' names and addresses from the office, divided Moscow into sections, and dispersed all over the city to canvass the apartments in person and to notify the students of the strike. To me was assigned the section of Gruzino and the Zoo. I recall how I tramped tirelessly through filthy courtyards, climbed up narrow backstairs, knocked at oilcloth-covered doors. But, of course, I found no one at home. What student would stay in his room on such a day? I put off my rounds to the following day.

But the very next morning unforeseen things happened. The frightened servant-girl rushed into my room: "Get up! The police!" In a moment, the "police" appeared in the doorway, represented by a faultlessly attired and well-mannered officer. I must have looked stunned, for he asked me "to take it easy" and then informed me that I had been expelled from the University and was to leave Moscow at

once for my home town. Within a half hour the trunk with my books and belongings was being loaded upon a cab, next to the driver, while I took the seat at the back beside the police officer. By this time, there were several such cabs in the street and the procedure of the transfer was always the same; first came the trunk, then the officer, and lastly the student. All the way to the station, cabs with deportee students were overtaking us (or we them) and there was a long line of us by the time we reached the station. We were in high spirits on the journey home, travelling all together in a special overcrowded car.

For myself, as for the majority of the deportees, these events had no dire consequences. In the fall we were readmitted to the University, to the same "course," however, so that one year of studies was lost.

Our experience had made us wiser, and it seemed that the students' movement itself had gained in maturity and spiritual strength. In 1899, it had been entirely spontaneous, without either a solid organization or a clear program. In 1901 it had both.

As two years before, the disorders broke out without preparation, but this time they were no longer confined to undergraduates. The general atmosphere had changed. The movement spread to the city and was joined by numbers of "lower-class intelligentsia" (a disparaging term used by the authorities).

In 1899, the students had gathered in small groups on the University campus. In 1901, we mingled with the intelligentsia and for a few days thronged the streets close to the University and the Riding Academy where the arrested participants of the student' illegal "general assembly" were locked up. The crowds tied up the street traffic. Students climbed on the tops of street cars, shouting and waving their caps. Many streets in other parts of the city also presented an unusual spectacle, with crowds gathering here and there, foreshadowing on a small scale the mass meetings of 1905. Cossack detachments called out by the police were riding through the streets. The crowds were driven into the courtyards, rounded up and checked. "Ringleaders" were arrested and taken to the Riding Academy. The number of the inmates grew from hour to hour. In the evening, a large crowd attacked the place in an attempt to free the prisoners. The government at last gave in. General Vannovsky, the newly appointed Minister of Public Education, was instructed by the Tsar "to investigate the educational system without delay" and to treat the students with "cordial solicitude."

The effect of this was electrifying. At one stroke the University was transformed. Beadles and inspectors vanished. Students gathered freely in the classrooms, discussing the events. Conferences of students with faculty members were held to debate the needs of the University. In this new atmosphere, a number of professors came to the fore as fighters for academic freedom, willing to engage the support of academically-minded student groups.

The leadership in this fight was assumed by Pavel Vinogradov, historian of European renown and professor at Oxford University. The "Vinogradov Commission" he brought into being became the central event of that period. It was the first (and the last) students' "parliament" at the University of Moscow. It had been first summoned to discuss a matter that had aroused strong emotions, the insult to female students contained in an article by Prince Meschersky in the reactionary paper *Grazhdanin*. We all considered the establishment of the Vinogradov Commission as an impressive victory for academic freedom. Delegates to the Commission were elected from the four "courses" separately in special electoral meetings presided over by professors. Voting was by secret ballot; the students went up to the lecturing-desk in single file and deposited their ballots in a student's cap. The contest was between two groups, the so-called "politicians" who supported the authority of the students' illegal "general assembly," and the "academicians" who put their faith in the prospective Vinogradov Commission. The "course" to which I belonged (fourth-year philologists) had a majority of "academicians" and I was one of their three elected delegates.

The only meeting of our students' "parliament" took place in the evening in one of the rooms of the old University Library. Before the opening, we gathered in an adjoining room for a preliminary exchange of views. The "politicians" proposed that the Commission dissolve voluntarily, since the will of the student body could be adequately expressed only through the "general assembly." "The academicians" insisted on the necessity "to make the most of the present legal opportunity." The arguments were reiterated at the official meeting of the Commission. The ballots were divided almost equally, all the delegates of the two junior courses voting for the assembly, those of the senior courses for the "legal opportunity." The issue was decided by the vote of the fifth-year medical students who unexpectedly went along with the "politicians." Professor Vinogradov quietly rose and declared the first representative as-

sembly of the students of the Moscow University "dissolved of its own free will."

Despite this act of self-surrender, our Commission was given the opportunity of championing students' rights on the occasion of General Vannovsky's visit to Moscow. The General wished to talk with the students and summoned the elected leaders of the various "courses" for an interview. With the characteristic ignorance of high brass, he was totally unaware that the election of such representatives was strictly forbidden by the existing University statutes. There was no time to hold new elections, and so the members of the dissolved Commission, one from every team of three representing a "course," went to the appointment with Vannovsky. In the lobby of the hotel where the Minister was staying, we held a hurried conference, discussing the list of the students' demands prepared by one of the "politicians," and its author was entrusted with the task of expounding it to the Minister. One item on that list, as I recall, was the demand for the abolition of the admission quota for Jewish students. The interview was cordial but yielded no practical results. Vannovsky himself was soon removed from office by "sovereign decree."

In the fall of 1901, the studies were resumed as usual, but the academic life, once dislocated, did not return to normal. The mood of the student body was such that a new flare-up was to be expected any day. The latent unrest made itself felt on any occasion, often without any tangible reason.

In October, all of a sudden, a new catchword appeared: "Let's catcall Guerrier!" It was alleged that old Professor Guerrier, historian of independent mind, prominent in public affairs, generally respected champion and organizer of higher education for women, in his capacity of Director of the Women's College, had behaved towards female students like an "oriental despot!" How and where this absurd and malicious slander had originated, I do not know; but the "politicians" made copious use of it both in leaflets and speeches directed against Guerrier. We, the senior philologists, who knew Guerrier well and respected him, were outraged by the base insinuations and literally rushed into battle. This was the first fight between "politicians" and "academicians" which involved the whole University. The politicians, of course, were not interested in Guerrier as a person, but only in fomenting revolutionary passions. We academicians, on the other hand, in defending Guerrier, defended the academic community against mob rule.

Agitation and counter-agitation were carried on vehemently in the classrooms. The academicians finally won, and Guerrier was spared the "catcalls." The clash, however, had yet another result; in the process of the fight, the two opposing factions crystallized and organized. Our foes formed the "Executive Committee" which undertook the political mobilization of the students. We, on our part, set up the "League for Academic Freedom," with the aim to rally the whole student body under the slogan of the fight for a free university "with academic methods and within the academic frame." The politicians shouted "Down with autocracy!"; the academicians, "Down with the board of inspectors!" The first clamored for a democratic constitution, the latter for an autonomous university. The propaganda on both sides was conducted with great vigor. New bulletins were issued daily, meetings were held between lectures, biting cartoons passed from hand to hand. Studies were neglected, and in this respect the academic year 1901-1902 was largely wasted.

Events developed swiftly, and not to the advantage of our faction. The first bulletin of our League was issued on November 15, and within a month our principal ally, Professor Vinogradov, disillusioned about the chances of a peaceful outcome of the struggle, left Moscow for good and went back to Oxford. A few days later, Vannovsky's "Provisional Regulations" with regard to students' organizations were published, which both we and our opponents denounced unanimously. Our next bulletin admitted the futility of any further legal struggle and called the students to organize illegally. The "politicians" were greatly heartened; their agitation for the general assembly and for a strike was now on sure ground. The general assembly actually took place on February 9.

That day, the University area presented the aspect it usually assumed during student disorders. The manège was occupied by police and troops (infantry this time). The adjoining streets were patrolled by police units and mounted gendarmerie who let pass only students. Meetings were held in both inner courts of the University; in that of the old building were gathered the partisans of the general assembly, its opponents as well as the "waverers" in the other. We spokesmen for the "academicians" pushed through to the Assembly Hall. Our appearance there was interpreted as a declaration of solidarity with the "Executive Committee" and we were met with applause. But as soon as we entered the debate and began to argue against political demands, our voices were drowned out by hissing and abuse. Realizing our failure, we left the Hall.

Our exit, however, hit a snag. All those who were leaving the Assembly Hall were being arrested on the spot and taken to the manège. We found there a big crowd, and new additions were brought in all the time. The arrested persons were placed in the center of the vast manège in groups of about one hundred separated by cordons of police and soldiers. At first the crowd was in good spirits; some started singing. But this was quickly brought to a stop. The chief of the mounted gendarmes, a young officer who apparently hated and despised the whole lot of us with every fiber of his impeccably groomed being, drew out his saber at the first sound of singing, screamed a command in a high falsetto and tore into the crowd, followed by his men, quickly isolating those who were singing. Towards evening we began to feel ravenously hungry. A hot supper was brought in for the guards but not for us. Nor was the expected bread ration forthcoming, and even the offer of our own money to buy some food was refused. The smokers, deprived of cigarettes, were even worse off than the rest, although some infantry officers had emptied their cigarette cases for them, behind the back of the police.

Late at night, tired out and hungry, we were brought out at last and arranged in a long column in the street. The by-now familiar, high falsetto shrieked out the ominous command: "Convoy order! To the Deportation Prison! March!"

We reached Butyrki, the Moscow deportation prison, at dawn and had to wait for a long time at the entrance, shivering with cold. . . . At last we were admitted and taken to the wards. An entire corridor had been set aside for the students. Curiously we looked about us—long rows of bunks, smoky lamps under the ceiling, vermin on the stained walls, massive doors with iron bolts, buckets in the corners. No doubt about it, this was a real prison.

At last hot water was brought in, together with provisions from a near-by grocery store: white bread, herring, sugar, tea, cigarettes. Food and tea revived our flagging spirits, and we proceeded to the distribution of bunks and the election of ward-monitors. Next morning, we were already setting up editorial boards for satirical reviews, chess clubs, choral groups. Anxiety and discontent were suppressed for the time being; on the surface there was nothing but the anticipation of new vivid experiences.

For myself, however, the thrilling experience came to an end the very next day when, quite unexpectedly, the "academicians" were separated from the others, according to a list drawn up by the Rector

of the University, and set free. I left the prison in a mood close to despair. . . .

To most undergraduates the spring semester was lost; public activities, on the other hand, were more intensive than ever. Conferences were held between students and sympathizing faculty members; new plans and projects were endlessly discussed. One of these projects was actually carried out and destined to play a considerable part in the history of the Moscow University. This was the Historico-Philological Students' Association, whose initiator and guiding spirit was the successor of Professor Vinogradov as leader of the academic faction, Sergey Trubetskoy. His principal collaborators were the old cadres of student "academicians."

The recollections of this Association belong to the happiest memories of my undergraduate days, and this feeling, no doubt, is shared by many others. They are closely connected with the memory of Trubetskoy's personality. It would be hard to say whom the students respected more, him or Vinogradov, but certainly he was the best beloved. He never kept aloof; he was one of us in the full meaning of the word. His enthusiasm, his devotion to the cause, his sense of duty, were unique.

Why did the Association enliven our university life to such a degree? What made it so exceedingly popular for a time? Possibly the fact that within an unfree University it formed a small island of freedom, it was a living symbol of true academic liberty. It was a university within a university, a university in the original meaning of the term, a confraternity of teachers and students, implying complete freedom of thought and speech, a high level of spiritual culture. Within this living academic community, everybody, even its official opponents, felt at home and at ease. This university in miniature contained autonomous sections corresponding to the "faculties" and embraced many branches of learning, including medicine.

The official "daytime" University offered a more solid and systematic scholarship; the night sessions of our Association had more freedom and a more sensitive response to life. All the burning problems and topics of the time were here reflected on an intellectual level.

To be sure, not even in its halcyon days did the Association present an altogether idyllic picture. The life of the nation was fraught with deep anxiety, and it was not for us to deflect it from its tragic course. Concern for the fate of the Association never left

us, and all too often the serenity of our "academic" outlook was shattered by the encroachments of a troubled political world. Our leader in the fight for intellectual freedom, Professor Trubetskoy, had become the principal target of the "politicians" who sarcastically called him in their leaflets "the prince turned sage. . . ."

In the fall of 1902, the Association faced a serious danger on the occasion of the reelection of its board. The opposing faction elected its candidates with the avowed purpose of undermining the Association from within. The Academicians again were victorious; but it was a Pyrrhic victory. Trubetskoy was leaving the country, and his speech on election day was his farewell address. Its theme was inspired by the leaflets circulated that very day among the audience, in which Trubetskoy was likened to the poet Nekrasov's "revellers, waggars of tongue, whose hands are steeped in blood. . . ." Trubetskoy's farewell speech marked the end of the Association and of "academicism." Its meetings, after his departure, were concluded with revolutionary songs and soon ceased altogether.

Two years later we buried Trubetskoy, who had suddenly died in the office of the Minister of Education, where he had gone as the Rector of Moscow University to defend the University's autonomy.

So many things had changed in the interval. So had we. . . . With my inner eye, I still see the auditorium in the new wing of the University, filled to overflowing with students. While the funeral service is being held in the chapel, we are here rehearsing the funeral march song of the revolution: "You fell a victim in the fateful fight. . . ." The melody, not yet hackneyed through constant repetition, rises sorrowful and majestic. Everybody joins in the song, both the friends and the recent foes of the "prince turned sage." . . . All join their efforts to prepare a revolutionary funeral for the man who had fought to keep the University independent of the revolution. Nothing could better illustrate the depth of the evolution undergone by the nation in those last two years! . . . The funeral service is over. The long procession moves towards the cemetery. Never has Moscow seen such an impressive mass of students, of the University and the Women's College, joined by people of every class, following the coffin in an endless line.

The revolutionary march song is surging and falling in waves, caught up by group after group. A profusion of red flowers, red ribbons.

Each of the singers in his own way, but with equal sincerity,

identified Trubetskoy in his heart with those many who had "fallen in the fateful fight." What does it matter that so many of the marchers were thinking not of the fight which had actually claimed Trubetskoy as its victim, but of the impending greater fight which to his last day he had striven to avert? For their noblest protagonists, both fights were truly "fateful" and inspired by a fervent love of the people.

Soviet Jurisprudence Since World War II

BY N. S. TIMASHEFF

ON June 20, 1950, an article appeared in *Pravda* signed by Stalin. The title was *On Marxism in Linguistics*. Its immediate goal was the demolition of a theory on linguistics created by the late N. Y. Marr, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

The implications of Stalin's "most valuable contribution to Marxism-Leninism,"¹ as his article started being called the very day of its publication, were not limited to the realm of linguistics. It performed a revolution in the social sciences and humanities. Most affected has been jurisprudence.

Language, declared Stalin, is not part of the superstructure which, according to the Marxian doctrine, is an epiphenomenon, a reflection in human minds of the varying configurations of the substructure tantamount to the economic system. Language is independent of the substructure and survives unchanged even the most drastic changes in the latter. Therefore, it is not especially tied to any particular social class; it is a product of national activity, developing according to immanent laws, just as technology does. The implication for law is this: since law is expressed in words, at least legal terminology transcends the fluctuations of the social order of production and the shift of power from one class to another.

Second, Stalin declared that, in socialist society, the old cannot be replaced by the new through "explosion"—he meant revolution but did not use the word. But if no revolution is possible, change can be effected only by political action, more exactly, by the policies of the Bolshevik Party, a euphemism for Stalin's decision. But policies are often embodied in legislation; therefore, law must play a much more important part than could be assumed by the Soviet jurists.

Third, repudiating a view commonly held by all Soviet experts on Marxism, Stalin said: "Marx and Engels were more modest [than Marr's followers]; they believed that their dialectical materialism

¹This is the title of an article by Professor M. Strogovich in *Sovietskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Soviet State and Law). This publication will be referred to hereafter as SGP.

was a product of the development of science, including philosophy, during the preceding period."

Finally, about the end of his article, Stalin strongly though hypocritically condemned the "Arakcheev régime," which until his article, had dominated the realm of linguistics, and stated that no science could develop and flourish without free criticism.

To understand the impact of Stalin's "immortal contribution" to jurisprudence, one must review the situation which prevailed before the fateful day of June 20, 1950.

In the course of the war and immediately after, many Soviet jurists had allowed themselves some liberties. Thus, for instance in a textbook on criminal procedure, published in 1946 by Professor M. Strogovich, the competitive nature of the Anglo-American procedure was emphasized and extolled; the author let it be understood that, in this regard, there was little difference between Anglo-American and Soviet law. In a text on Soviet criminal law, Professor A. Piontkovsky formulated a number of definitions covering legal configurations of various epochs and belonging to societies of various types. In an essay devoted to the criticism of some bourgeois theories of state and law, Professor A. Denisov stressed the progressive rôle of the German idealistic philosophy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In a general form, S. Bratus, writing on legal entities according to Soviet law, stated: "One does not have to repudiate the achievements of bourgeois jurisprudence and avoid using them, though naturally they must be used critically and with due caution. Not all that has been said by bourgeois jurists is wrong."²

On the other hand, many Soviet jurists were rather careless with respect to the Marxian dogma. I. Levin managed to write an *Outline of Soviet State and Law* (1947) almost free of quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Many texts were written and recommended by the top agencies of the Soviet system of education in a pragmatic form, reproducing chronologically or systematically the statements of Soviet law and avoiding any "scientific" (read: Marxian) analysis of its content.³

Some of the statements reported above appeared as late as 1947 or 1948; in the Soviet Union publication is slow, so that the books and articles in question must have been written much earlier. This

²A. Denisov, in *Trudi voienno-iuridicheskoi akademii*, VI (1947); S. Bratus as quoted in SGP 1951 No. 4, p. 34.

³Later on, these shortcomings were acknowledged in *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, 1947, No. 3, and *Kultura i Zhizn*, August 31, 1948.

is obvious because late in 1946 the tide turned. On October 5, two months after Zhdanov's all-out attack on literature, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a decision on the expansion and improvement of legal education. This was, in actuality, a severe criticism of the work of Soviet jurists, which was called unsatisfactory and confusing; it gave the signal for a general attack on those jurists who took the liberties described above. They were denounced for "objectivism," formalism, and servility before the West. Since early 1948, the last of these sins started being called cosmopolitanism. Most sweeping has been the criticism by A. Stalguevich. According to him, Soviet jurisprudence is dominated by bourgeois ideology; *all* the works bear the traits of "normativism," "formalism," and "vulgar sociologism." A. Denissov was singled out by him for having repeated views expressed by G. Alexandrov in his *History of Western Philosophy* which, for a while, was the standard work on the subject but later fell into disgrace. A similar reproach was made to Piontkovsky.⁴

M. Strogovich, said Chkhikvadze,⁵ establishes similarities between criminal procedure in the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon democracies, veiling the reactionary objectives of the latter and not mentioning the fundamental differences between the two. Strogovich seems to have been very scared. In great haste he wrote an article entitled "Let Us Uproot Bourgeois Deviations from the Soviet Science of State and Law,"⁶ in other words, uproot that of which he was accused. He acknowledged that, in his works, he made many wrong, non-Marxian evaluations of democracy and emphatically stated that, when one pierces through the crust of the Anglo-American procedure, one cannot but see its class nature, reactionary and oppressive.

From the criticism of cosmopolitanism, two curious propositions have emerged. First, there is no such thing as law in general, declared Chkhikvadze; there always has been and there is now only the law of a definite social type. Therefore, every definition applicable to state and law in general is idealistic and cosmopolitan, said Shevchenko.⁷

⁴SGP 1949, No. 1, 26 ff.; 1950, No. 1, pp. 37, 41.

⁵His article appeared in SGP, 1949, No. 4, pp. 9 ff. under the significant title "Let Us Develop Soviet Patriotism in Jurisprudence."

⁶*Ibid.*, 1949, No. 5, pp. 34 ff.

⁷Chkhikvadze, *op. cit.*, *supra*, note 5, and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 7, 1949; Shevchenko in *Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*, 1950, No. 8.

This set of propositions was mainly directed against Strogovich. But the latter, who apologized so humbly when his rosy picture of Anglo-American procedure was taken to task, allowed himself to be firm in the matter of general concepts. Without such concepts, he said, one could not compare the institutions of Soviet law with the law of the exploiters and show the superiority of the former.⁸

It is noteworthy that, until 1951, views of one author have remained unattacked despite his denial of the proposition that general concepts covering both Soviet and bourgeois law were impossible. In an article entitled "Marxism-Leninism on the Various Types of State and Law,"⁹ N. Alexandrov (not to be confused with G. Alexandrov mentioned above) has made an attempt to distinguish, in state and law, "common" and "particular" elements. What is "common" to every state, is the use of coercion with the objective of imposing the will of the dominant class; "particular" is that which shows the will of which class is being imposed.

The other proposition which emerged from the attack on cosmopolitanism is this: there can be no institution common to Soviet law and to the law of the exploiters, a term more and more often used since 1949. This is, however, a proposition which often leads the Soviet jurists into blind alleys. Thus, for instance, M. Cheltsov argues that, since the Anglo-American procedure is competitive, the Soviet is inquisitorial.¹⁰ This, in fact, is the case, but acknowledgement of this fact is impossible since the inquisitorial procedure is commonly considered inferior to the competitive.

Another case, and a more drastic one, has been the discussion of the presumption of the innocence of the defendant. Since it exists in bourgeois law, it cannot exist in Soviet law. V. S. Tadevosyan states accordingly that in Soviet law the defendant must prove his innocence.¹¹ Again, this is true, but unacceptable. The problem was solved by M. Savitsky who bluntly said that, in bourgeois practice, the presumption did not exist and that, therefore, its existence in Soviet law could be safely asserted.¹² A new item was thus added to the long list of Russian inventions wrongly attributed to foreigners.

It is noteworthy that the man who has done more than anybody

⁸*Op. cit.*, *supra*, note 6.

⁹SGP 1950, No. 6, 22 ff.

¹⁰Fundamental principles of Soviet Criminal Procedure, as quoted in SGP 1950, No. 1.

¹¹SGP 1948, No. 6.

¹²*Ibid.*, 1950, No. 1, p. 50.

else to denounce cosmopolitanism, Stalguevich, has also been denounced as one of the gang. "For many years Stalguevich's scientific activity," writes Chkhikvadze, "has been confined to the vilification of Soviet jurisprudence."

Not only subservience to the West has been denounced. Every pseudo-Marxian or half-Marxian statement of authors who have written in the mood of independence has been taken to task. One of the main targets of attack has been a collective textbook on *The Theory of State and Law*, edited by Trainin and Levin. In May, 1949, the Ministry of Higher Education dropped the textbook from the list of books recommended for use in Soviet schools.

Such were the conditions in Soviet jurisprudence when the bomb of Stalin's article exploded. These conditions were those of *bellum omnium contra omnes*, with not very definite trends or purposes, perhaps except that of complying with the direction of the Central Committee on more criticism.

After Stalin's intervention, definite trends could be established. They have been four. First, the laudatory trend. Articles started appearing in large numbers glorifying Stalin's contribution to Marxism. Among the authors there were many who had been criticized for the poor quality of the Marxian ingredient in their work. Meetings were called by the Academy of Sciences, especially by its Law Institute, by the "chairs"¹³ of the theory of state and law in various universities, by the editorial boards of legal publications, and so on. A good deal of time and energy was spent in a new access of Stalin's idolatry.

Second, criticism has been redirected, against those who had been unable to guess Stalin's new ideas. In this regard, "candidate of philosophical sciences" (read: Marxism) V. Nikolaev has performed the main job. He first published a rather vague article in *Pravda* (August 19, 1950). Another article published in *Bolshevik*¹⁴ was directed against the journal, *Soviet State and Law*, the only Soviet legal periodical of some scientific value. The article began by quoting Stalin's discovery about the active rôle of the superstructure in socialist society. This discovery, said the author, imposed important tasks on Soviet jurisprudence. It had to show what Soviet law had already achieved to promote the socialist reconstruction

¹³In the Soviet Union, the universities are divided into "faculties" each of which consists of "chairs" grouping, under a chairman, all the instructors teaching in a particular field; e.g., Criminology.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 1951, No. 7.

of society, and what more it could do in that regard; but the journal in question did not say a word about these topics. There followed a short survey of a few articles having appeared *before* Stalin's bomb. Naturally, nothing in them was in line with Stalin's new thought.

This line of attack has had an interesting consequence. A. Y. Vishinsky, who had been its editor, has lost this position. This does not mean that he has fallen into disgrace. On the contrary, an article appeared in the journal devoted to the definition of Soviet socialist law in which the author "proved" that Vishinsky's definition offered in 1938 was still the only correct one.¹⁵

Third, a trend has emerged which could be called exegetic and offensive: exegetic in the meaning of drawing conclusions from Stalin's statements; offensive in the meaning of a movement against some of the ideas which had been taken for granted during the previous period. "Doctor of legal sciences" N. Kazantseff seems to have been designated to lead the movement. In several speeches and articles¹⁶ he said approximately this: the active rôle of the legal phase of the superstructure requires more attention to legal terminology. This terminology, as language in general, does not depend on the substructure, or the class composition of society. In consequence, Shevchenko's view is nothing but "a vulgarization of Marxism."

Other authors joined him, once again from among those most criticized in the years 1947-50. Professor Denissov dared to say this: "I am told that my work contains mistakes. Of course, it does—how could a Soviet scholar claim infallibility? But I do not know in what they consist."¹⁷ Most probably he had in view Stalin's recognition of the fact that Marx and Engels had scientific ancestors, the very statement for which Denissov had been under heavy attack. Political and legal theories, he added, influence not only the political and legal phase of the superstructure, but even the substructure.¹⁸

Similar views were expressed during the discussion of Stalin's article at the Moscow Law Institute. Stalin, said one of the participants, emphasizes the rôle of the subjective factor, of men and their ideas, in the formation of political and legal institutions. Professor N. N. Poliansky drew another conclusion. Since Stalin holds in

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 1951, No. 5.

¹⁶The articles appeared in SGP 1951, Nos. 3 and 4.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 1951, No. 2, p. 83.

¹⁸Denissov, *op. cit.*, p. 14, *supra*, note 2.

esteem the historico-comparative method, general concepts must be used, since, without them, the method is inapplicable.¹⁹

Another author, V. Ivanov, made an interesting statement, obviously inspired by Stalin's words about the Arakcheev régime in linguistics. Replying to Chkhikvadze, he said that, in the latter's view, every general concept covering the state and the law of bourgeois and socialist society was subversive (*kramolny*).²⁰

Strogovich, many times mentioned above, used the opportunity to improve his position and simultaneously to impose his views on the necessity of using general concepts. Attacking Cheltsov's conception of the nature of Soviet criminal procedure, he reasoned this way: why did Cheltsov come to his absurd position? Because he conceived competition in criminal procedure only in the form known to bourgeois law and, not finding anything of the same kind in Soviet law, denied its competitive character. His mistake is this: he did not dare to construct a general concept of competitive procedure covering both Soviet and bourgeois law.²¹

Still farther went several Soviet jurists who, at a joint meeting of the "chair" of international law of the University of Moscow and of the State Institute of Foreign Relations, asserted that there was law common to Soviet and bourgeois society; such was, for instance, the Charter of the United Nations.²²

Any one of the statements reported above would have been unthinkable before Stalin's intervention. But a fourth trend in the discussion can be also observed, this one restrictive and defensive: restrictive in the meaning of cautioning against going too far in interpreting the Master's words; defensive in the meaning of re-asserting some of the views which had prevailed before June 20, 1950.

The same Professor Poliansky who seized the opportunity to affirm the necessity of concepts common to Soviet and bourgeois law, later on doubted the possibility of identifying both Soviet procedure and bourgeois procedure as instances of the same type. Soviet procedure, he said, is possible only in socialist society, and nowhere else. V. Kurliandsky resumed the attack against Professor Pionkovsky's textbook on criminal law because of the use of general concepts and definitions. There is, he said, no general concept of crime,

¹⁹SGP 1950, No. 9, p. 23; 1951, No. 3, p. 64.

²⁰"Some Problems of the Theory of State and Law in the Light of Stalin's Work on Linguistics," SGP 1950, pp. 20-1.

²¹Strogovich, *op. cit.*, *supra*, note 14.

²²SGP 1951, No. 3, p. 67; No. 6, p. 33.

because the Soviet concept requires that the action be dangerous to society, while the bourgeois concept does not.²³

Moreover, in Nikolaev's second article one finds statements directed against N. Alexandrov, who was bold enough to speak of general and particular concepts of state and law *before* Stalin's implicit permission to do so. According to Alexandrov, said Nikolaev, the Soviet state, so far as it is covered by the general concept of the state, does not differ from the bourgeois state; on the other hand, so far as it is not covered by the general concept, it appears to be not a state at all.

All these statements—and quite a few more could be cited—mean that the liberty to operate with general concepts, in accordance with Stalin's "most valuable contribution to Marxism," does not go very far.

The third and the fourth trends contradict one another. Their co-existence seems to display some indecision in the Kremlin as to what conclusions ought to be drawn, in jurisprudence, from Stalin's words. Most probably, the men in the Kremlin could reconcile the old and the new views in this way: though the basic concepts of law are independent of the substructure, Soviet law cannot have anything in common with bourgeois law, for it is Russian law, and everything Russian is different from, and superior to, anything Western. If it is so, statements about Russia's priority in the field of law must become more frequent. By the way, in addition to Savitsky's discovery reported above, Jean Bodin has been recently dethroned in favor of the Russian abbot Joseph who, allegedly, unfolded the theory of sovereignty in 1505.²⁴

At this point, a new and insuperable contradiction arises. As Russian culture in general, Russian jurisprudence excelled in penetrating and assimilating elements of foreign culture. This was expressed in the fact that, more than their European colleagues, Russian jurists were interested in comparative law which broadened their scientific horizon. Now the Soviet jurists are ordered to concentrate on things Russian minus one of the most valuable among these things, the ability to think along supranational lines. Despite the hopes provoked by Stalin's revolution in the Marxian dogma, the Soviet jurists are condemned to concentrate on futile and sterile disputes about the intrinsic excellency of Soviet law.

²³*Ibid.*, 1951, No. 11, pp. 34, 43.

²⁴V. Zuev, "The Priority of Russian Science in the Creation of the Theory of Sovereignty," SGP 1951, No. 3, pp. 25-6.

Pobedonostsev's Thought Control

BY ARTHUR E. ADAMS

PARTICIPATION in official censorship activities was only a small portion of Konstantin Pobedonostsev's total effort to control Russia's thought. By misusing the powers his official position in state and church gave him, he was able to extend his influence and to make himself a sort of "censor extraordinary." In this capacity, he made suppression a personal task at which he worked with a calculating and deadly persistence. With a like singleness of purpose, he endeavored to encourage men whose views were in conformance with his own.

Perhaps the most famous among his victims was Count Leo Tolstoy. The conflict may be said to have begun in 1881, when Tolstoy sent a letter to Pobedonostsev and asked that it be forwarded to the new Emperor. This letter petitioned Alexander to show mercy to the men who had just assassinated his father, Alexander II. Pobedonostsev, who was determined that the revolutionaries should be exterminated, did not forward the letter. Instead, he held it until after the trial and the execution of the revolutionaries; then only did he write to Tolstoy, explaining his actions thus:

... do not believe evil of me for having failed to carry out your commission. In such important matters one must be guided by faith. After I had read through your letter I came to the conviction that your faith does not agree with mine and the Church's and that our Christ—is not your Christ.

My Christ is a man of strength and truth who heals frailty; but in your [Christ] it seemed to me I found the traits of someone who is in need of healing. This is the basis upon which I, according to my faith, could not carry out your instructions.¹

Following this, Pobedonostsev continued to attack. In 1883, he labored for the suppression of Tolstoy's book, *What I Believe*, and succeeded in suppressing the journal which was to publish it.² When the book was printed, he ordered it seized and burned, although in

¹P. I. Biryukov, *L. N. Tolstoy*, Berlin, 1921, II, 292-93; quoted in Friedrich Steinmann and Elias Hurwicz, *Konstantin Petrowitsch Pobjedonoszew der Staatsmann der Reaktion unter Alexander III*, Königsberg, 1933, pp. 29-32; cf. E. J. Simmons, *Leo Tolstoy*, Boston, 1946, pp. 337-38.

²K. P. Pobedonostsev, "Pisma K. P. Pobedonostseva k E. M. Feoktistovu," *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, Nos. 22-24 (1935), pp. 502-503 (hereafter cited as "Pisma k Feoktistovu").

reality the confiscated copies were secretly distributed among certain high officials of St. Petersburg.³ The next work to be attacked was the famous drama, *The Power of Darkness*, which Tolstoy wrote in 1886 and which he hoped to present on the stage in 1887.⁴ In this case, Pobedonostsev's interference prevented the presentation of *The Power of Darkness* to the public until 1895.⁵ In 1888, Pobedonostsev condemned Tolstoy's latest work, *On Life*, and the book was forbidden publication. Printed abroad later, it was admitted to Russia only in a carefully censored edition.⁶

The *Kreutzer Sonata* was next to suffer.⁷ In his effort to convince the Emperor of the danger of this work, Pobedonostsev wrote these words about Tolstoy in November, 1891:

Tolstoy is a fanatic of his insanity, and unfortunately, he attracts and leads into insanity thousands of light-headed people. How much harm and ruin have arisen from him it is difficult to calculate. Unfortunately, the madmen who believe in Tolstoy are overcome just as he is, with the spirit of unsubdued propaganda, and they strive to put his teaching into action and to carry it to the people.⁸

This struggle with Tolstoy continued through 1894 and 1896, when Pobedonostsev interfered with the publication of two of Tolstoy's articles.⁹ Moreover, because Nicholas II was not anxious to make Tolstoy a martyr, Pobedonostsev also turned his attack upon the great novelist's more vulnerable friends. The paintings of N. N. Ge and I. E. Repin were criticized, and the religious sympathizers and followers of Tolstoy suffered persecutions.¹⁰ When, in 1900, Pobedonostsev returned again to the direct attack, he used the Holy Synod as a weapon. In 1900, it was announced that Tolstoy would be refused the right of religious burial; and in 1901, Leo Tolstoy was formally excommunicated from the Orthodox Church.¹¹ Thus, through a score of years, Pobedonostsev personally endeavored to suppress the writings and the ideas of Leo Tolstoy. He failed prima-

³*Ibid.*, p. 508; Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

⁴Pobedonostsev, *Pisma Pobedonostseva k Aleksandru III*, Moscow, 1925-26, II, 131-34 (hereafter cited as *Pisma*).

⁵*Ibid.*, II, 132; Pobedonostsev, *K. P. Pobedonostsev i ego korrespondenty, pisma i zapiski*, Vol. I, *Novum Regnum*, Moscow, 1923, p. 643; Pobedonostsev, "Pisma k Feoktistovu," pp. 524-27, and notes; Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

⁶Pobedonostsev, "Pisma k Feoktistovu," pp. 529-30.

⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 540-41; Simmons, *op. cit.*, pp. 441-42, 449.

⁸Pobedonostsev, *Pisma*, II, 252.

⁹Pobedonostsev, "Pisma k Feoktistovu," pp. 553-54, 560.

¹⁰Biryukov, *op. cit.*, III, 319; Pobedonostsev, *Novum Regnum*, p. 963.

¹¹Simmons, *op. cit.*, pp. 594-95.

rily because the author's immense popularity made the government reluctant to implement effective suppression.

Other men were not as strongly placed as Leo Tolstoy; consequently, they suffered far more from Pobedonostsev's campaign to suppress them. In the case of Vladimir Soloviev, the campaign, if not more successful, was at least more painful. Because Soloviev spoke out for clemency for the assassins of Alexander II, in 1881, he too was considered a suspect by Pobedonostsev, who followed his teaching and writing activities with close attention.¹² In 1883, Pobedonostsev requested from the Minister of Internal Affairs a promise that Soloviev would not speak at a coming meeting; and in 1887, the clerical censor prohibited Soloviev's publishing.¹³ Articles by "crazy Vladimir" couldn't possibly get through the clerical censor, as Pobedonostsev wrote to Feoktistov,¹⁴ and to the Emperor he wrote that Soloviev had become the creature of Tolstoy.¹⁵ That such malevolent persecution had considerable effect is indicated by a letter from Soloviev, written to Pobedonostsev in 1892, demanding to know why his recent work had been condemned as "filthy rubbish" and why other men had been ordered to have nothing to do with him.¹⁶ Soloviev's objections, however, did not free him from Pobedonostsev's continued persecution.

Tolstoy and Soloviev are, perhaps, the two outstanding examples of Pobedonostsev's extraordinary censorship; but they are only the most important representatives of a host of men who were his victims. Lesser men were crushed mercilessly, and their writings were destroyed.¹⁷

Second to his efforts to suppress unwelcome thought were Pobedonostsev's efforts to encourage the men and the publications whose ideas were closely related to his own. Because of his high position, as well as his wily intrigues, he was an invaluable friend to have at court, and he used his power to protect and at the same time to influence the men of his circle.

¹²D. Stremoukhoff, *Vladimir Soloviev et son oeuvre messianique*, Paris, 1935, pp. 122-25.

¹³Pobedonostsev, *Novum Regnum*, p. 323; Stremoukhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 198, 301-302.

¹⁴E. M. Feoktistov was Chief of the Civil Censorship Office and Pobedonostsev's loyal servant: see "Pisma k Feoktistovu."

¹⁵Pobedonostsev, "Pisma k Feoktistovu," p. 545; Pobedonostsev, *Pisma*, II, 253.

¹⁶Pobedonostsev, *Novum Regnum*, pp. 969-70.

¹⁷Pobedonostsev, "Pisma k Feoktistovu," pp. 502-60; A. Kizevetter, "Pobedonostsev," *Na Chuzhoi storone*, IV (1924), 265.

An important example of this use of patronage is Pobedonostsev's relationship with Mikhail Katkov, the conservative publicist and editor of the powerful *Moskovskiya Vedomosti*. Katkov was one of the leading members of the conservative group and even after his death in 1887, the *Moskovskiya Vedomosti* was regarded as the most powerful conservative journal in Russia and its articles were looked upon by foreign states as almost official statements of government policy.

The friendship of these two men was of long standing. The views of both concurred in many instances, although Katkov, with his publicist's style and unofficial position, was inclined to be more outspoken and belligerent in the expression of his opinions than the prudent Pobedonostsev. In 1881, Katkov served as informer for Pobedonostsev, warning him of the intrigues to be expected at the State Council.¹⁸ Later, when Pobedonostsev was trying to push the Minister of the Interior, Ignatev, out of government, he sent Feoktistov to suggest to Katkov that Ignatev's plans be criticized in the columns of the *Moskovskiya Vedomosti*. Katkov's scathing criticism in an editorial of May 15, 1882, probably helped bring about Ignatev's dismissal that same day.¹⁹ And when in 1887, the hot-tempered Katkov went too far in his criticism of the government's foreign policy and it was the Emperor's intention to warn him publicly, Pobedonostsev interceded, pleading that Katkov was "a highly talented journalist, intelligent, sensitive to true Russian interests and to the firm preservation of principles."²⁰ Arguing that an offended Katkov might close his journal, which had long served the state, Pobedonostsev offered a proposal of his own. Let Feoktistov journey to Moscow and explain the Emperor's displeasure to Katkov in private. This would save Katkov's *amour propre*, but it would also make the necessary correction and keep the *Moskovskiya Vedomosti* in circulation. The Emperor followed this plan.²¹

Perhaps the most interesting and controversial instance of Pobedonostsev's influence is his patronage of Feodor Dostoevsky. Pobedonostsev met the author in the winter of 1871, and a friendship

¹⁸Pobedonostsev, *Novum Regnum*, p. 170.

¹⁹Pobedonostsev, *L'Autocratie russe: mémoires politiques, correspondance officielle et documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire du règne de l'empereur Alexandre III de Russie 1881-1894*, Paris, 1927, p. 172.

²⁰Pobedonostsev, *Pisma*, II, 141.

²¹*Ibid.*, II, 141, 150-51; Pobedonostsev, *Novum Regnum*, p. 793.

was established immediately.²² In 1873, Dostoevsky became editor of the *Grazhdanin*; and, thereafter, he was welcomed in Pobedonostsev's home on Saturday evenings each week, when the two men enjoyed conversations which sometimes lasted until well after midnight.²³ Very quickly this friendship developed into collaboration. Pobedonostsev actively aided Dostoevsky in composing the issues of the *Grazhdanin*, and contributed articles anonymously to the paper.²⁴ When Dostoevsky began another journalistic venture, the publication of his *Diary of a Writer*, Pobedonostsev was again at hand to help. He gave Dostoevsky a "detailed evaluation of almost every issue of this publication; he was the invisible consultant of the writer on the most important questions of current state policies. . . ."²⁵ Thus, for example, when Dostoevsky cruelly satirized the suicide of Liza Herzen, daughter of Alexander Herzen, in his *Diary of a Writer*, it was because Pobedonostsev had noted the event and sent the information to Dostoevsky.²⁶

For such favors, Dostoevsky was very grateful.²⁷ In the spring of 1880, he wrote: "With the coming year, I have already resolved to resume the *Diary of a Writer*, without fail. Then again I shall run to you (as I ran to you in other days) for instructions I fervently believe you will not refuse me."²⁸

And, when Pobedonostsev warmly approved the latest issue, Dostoevsky wrote: "I thank you with all my soul for your good, beautiful and inspiring letter. Especially inspiring because I, as a man, always need encouragement from those whom I believe in, whose wisdom and convictions I deeply respect."²⁹

It is possible that Pobedonostsev was able to encourage Dostoevsky with more than advice: he was probably responsible in part for the subscription list of the *Diary of a Writer*. The fact that a large number of subscribers were representatives of the highest clerical offices may be explained "by the recommendation of Dostoevsky's publication by the Holy Synod."³⁰

²²N. Belchikov, "Dostoevsky i Pobedonostsev," *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, II (1922), 244.

²³Pobedonostsev, *Pisma*, I, 311.

²⁴L. Grossman, "Dostoevsky i pravitelstvennye krugi 1870-kh godov," *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, No. 15 (1934), pp. 124-29.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 130-31; F. Dostoevsky, *Diary of a Writer*, trans. and annotated by Boris Brasol, New York, 1949, I, 468-69.

²⁷Belchikov, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 248: Letter of 19 May 1880.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 251: Letter of 16 August 1880.

³⁰Grossman, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

A further very important influence is suggested by a letter of Pobedonostev's, written to Ivan Aksakov, in 1881, two days after Dostoevsky's death. In this letter, Pobedonostsev claimed influence which it is difficult to attribute even to him: "I knew this man well [Pobedonostsev wrote]. For him my Saturday evenings were reserved, and not infrequently his wife accompanied him. And his 'Zosima,' he conceived according to my suggestions. . . ." ³¹

The reference to Zosima is a reference to that section of *Brothers Karamazov* first published under the title, "A Russian Monk." Dostoevsky regarded it as the culmination of all his work, ³² and there are many who agree that it is his best and most profound study. The implication of Pobedonostsev's letter is clear; he is claiming responsibility for the conception of Zosima. It is possible that Zosima was indeed drawn in partial accordance with Pobedonostsev's own religious ideas, but it does not appear probable that Pobedonostsev's responsibility could have gone further than the expression of his abstract religious principles. However, if he was in truth the inspirer of Dostoevsky's Zosima, then it must be assumed that the man who borrowed almost all of his ideas because of his inability to develop his own, was godfather of one of the most profoundly conceived characters in Russian literature. This, at least, is the implication of Pobedonostsev's letter.

Whatever we may think of the claim that Pobedonostsev suggested Zosima, it must be granted that his assistance, encouragement, and approval helped develop some of Dostoevsky's most significant political ideas, especially as they were expressed in the *Diary of a Writer*. Undoubtedly, "some of the pages of his social writings were prepared in official circles and were inspired by their leaders." ³³ Chief among these leaders was Pobedonostsev.

In sum, Pobedonostsev's efforts to influence literary production went far beyond his control of civil and clerical censorship. By personally interfering in the affairs of the press he immensely extended his power over Russian thought. He was able to hinder the publication efforts of at least two of Russia's most important thinkers—Tolstoy and Solovev. On the other hand, he effectively encouraged and influenced the ideas expressed by two other important figures—Katkov and Dostoevsky.

³¹Belchikov, *op. cit.*, p. 241; Grossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

³²Belchikov, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

³³Grossman, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

Book Reviews

EINAUDI, MARIO; DOMENACH, JEAN-MARIE; GAROSCI, ALDO. *Communism in Western Europe*. Ithaca, Cornell University, 1951. 239 pp. \$3.00.

GLUCKSTEIN, YGAEL. *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1952. 333 pp. \$4.50.

Professor Einaudi points out that for any study of modern Communism three areas occupy a position of paramount significance: (1) Soviet Russia and its European satellites, (2) China, and (3) Western Europe. The books under review deal with two of these areas: the Soviet satellites in Europe (except Albania), and Western Europe, which Professor Einaudi defines for his purposes as France and Italy. In the latter, although Communism "has now a larger popular support than Soviet Communism was ever able to achieve during the first half of its existence or than Mao has today," Communism is not in power but is waging a conflict within "societies that are fighting back politically and institutionally." In the Soviet satellites, on the other hand, Communism is in power and the effects of its coming into power can to a considerable extent be studied. The two books, therefore, are largely complementary. The first is the initial volume of a series to be devoted to the political, economic, and constitutional problems of postwar France and Italy, and is the result of a "French-Italian Inquiry" started at Cornell University in 1949. It contains a well-annotated bibliography which will be of great value to those who wish to read

further on Communism in Western Europe. The second is a careful study of the economic and political changes that have occurred since 1944 in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The author has for many years engaged in research on the economic, social, and political characteristics of the Soviet régime. In the preparation of this book he relied mainly on the official governmental and Communist Party publications of the countries studied, on their diplomatic representatives and information services, and on books, pamphlets, and papers secured from exiles from Eastern Europe. Although the book contains no bibliography, it is copiously documented in the text.

Communism in Western Europe deals with "the phenomenon which is at the root of the difficulties of our times, Communism." It is a very readable book which contains a wealth of information on the rise and growth of the French and Italian Communist parties, their principles of doctrine and action, their organization and leaders, their appeal to the various elements of society, their present status and future prospects. Among all the nations of free Europe, Communism has developed as a dominant movement only in France and Italy. Communism in these countries in 1951 was "the strongest and most effective single political force in Western Europe." The major source of its strength in France and Italy is "the persistence of the defense of old attitudes, in spite of the evidence that Communism will make head-

way in societies which remain closed and static." J.-M. Domenach believes that the fundamental psychic element of the postwar European crisis is the inarticulate despair of Europeans who "have seen the agony of capitalism as a result of wars, Fascism, and concentration camps" and who "expect nothing good to come from its artificial resurrection." That, he holds, is why the Marshall Plan of itself has aroused so little enthusiasm among the European masses and why, on the other hand, Communism profits greatly from the feeling that European capitalism is doomed. For, in these countries Communism has largely identified itself as "the carrier of the traditions of revolutionary change," and this is particularly effective when "there is evidence on all sides that France and Italy have not yet completed the cycle that in the United Kingdom and the United States has brought about the modernization of economic and political life and the use of power in the public interest." Besides this major source there are several specific sources of Communism's strength in these countries. Among them are: (1) the argument that in a bourgeois capitalistic society workers and peasants are deprived of "advantages that all have a right to expect from the community in which they live"; (2) the sense of insecurity caused by the weakening economic positions of France and Italy; (3) the belief that Communism is a staunch defender of laicism against the rising tide of clericalism; (4) the belief that Communism is anti-Fascist and therefore the party of freedom and peace; (5) the conviction that Communism's rôle in the Resistance movements was exten-

sive and decisive; (6) the creation of a political vacuum left by Fascism and war, which Communism filled; (7) an increased sympathy for Communism, resulting from the sliding of anti-Communism toward the right in the guise of neo-Fascism and Gaullism. In order to defeat the Communist conspiracy for the conquest of the world, according to Professor Einaudi, the unyielding resistance and the military might of the United States, developed in conjunction with that of its allies, are of the essence. But Western European Communism cannot be considered wholly as a police problem. What is required is "the acceleration of all processes tending to build modern institutions, more substantial integration, and fully open societies." The most encouraging sign for the future, he believes, "is that the responsible leaders of France and Italy have shown their belief in that integration of the West which alone can create conditions of permanent political and economic advance."

It would certainly help greatly in mobilizing the people of the West in the struggle against Communism if all could in some way be made aware of the economic, political, social, and religious conditions now existing in the states of Eastern Europe, as set forth in *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*. In the first part of this book Mr. Gluckstein shows how the chief means of production and exchange in these satellites are in the hands of the state (in part the Russian state), and how they will undoubtedly become more and more so concentrated. As to changes in land ownership, he concludes that in Hungary "the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step"; in Rumania it

"was less extensive but of the same general character"; in Czechoslovakia and Poland it constituted in the main the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria "the changes were very small indeed." So far as industry, transport, banking, insurance, and trade are concerned, the author agrees with S. Perlman, in *Problems of the Post-War World*, that the German occupation of these countries destroyed capitalism, for it "so churned up all existing property rights that their restoration even approximately . . . is unthinkable." The military defeat of Germany left a very great part of the industry, transport, and banks of the East European countries ownerless. Nationalization resulted, and the details of the process are discussed for each country. The differences in the nationalization policies show how the "policy has in every case been determined by the interests of the rulers of Russia." Mr. Gluckstein points out that the need for capital in Eastern Europe is paramount. "No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living [in the satellites] is possible without rapid industrialization," but "industrialization on a large enough scale to absorb . . . the yearly natural increase of the employable population and the agricultural overpopulation can be carried out only by forcing the people to save." Russia herself can help her satellites very little in the matter of capital, for she is faced with the same problem as her satellites. As a result of her own backwardness Russia looks upon them as an additional source of industrial strength and generally favors their industrialization though

"she will of course reserve for herself the first fruits of their industrial development." Part I of this book is a mine of useful information on economic conditions in Eastern Europe since before World War I.

The second part shows that the satellites have undemocratic, totalitarian, police régimes, so that their resources are not owned "by the people . . . but by the self-appointing and self-perpetuating bureaucracy itself." In the chapters of Part II are discussed Russia's intervention in the satellite states, the Communist seizure of control of police and army, the establishment of the totalitarian "People's Democracies," the nationalistic conflicts—particularly between the Slavs and the Germans and Hungarians—with the resultant expulsion of the non-Slavs, and the Communist attempts to regiment the churches. Part III is concerned with the conflict between Stalin and Tito. According to the author, "Titoism expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy." He discusses Stalin's desire to keep Yugoslavia a backward colonial country, and explains the Stalin-Tito differences over Yugoslavia's agricultural policy, the rôle of the Communist Party in the Yugoslav People's Front, the question of Balkan federation, and the future of Macedonia. He enumerates the measures taken by Stalin against Tito and describes the latter's "exposure" of Stalin. He then discusses the "epidemic of Titoism in Eastern Europe" and even the Titoists within the Soviet Union.

Just as the first book finds an encouraging sign for the future, so does the second. Mr. Gluckstein

points out that hardly had Stalin's empire extended into Central Europe than cracks began to appear in its structure, and he raises "the question of whether an empire with a materially and culturally backward 'mother' country can exist." He points out further that in all fairly stable empires hitherto "the ruling nation has had a higher material and cultural level than the ruled nations." He argues that the Russians as a whole are much poorer than the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, and that "the further the Stalinist empire advances westwards the larger will be its population whose standards of living and culture are higher than those of the Russian peoples." His conclusion is reflected in the title of his last chapter, "Stalin's Empire Has No Future." Americans had better not yet abandon their interest in NATO and the Mutual Security Administration, however, for it is well to recall that in 1918-1919 there were many who proclaimed that Lenin's empire had no future.

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CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY. *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*. New York, Macmillan, 1952. New Ed., 2 vols. \$15.00.

The Macmillan Company is to be congratulated for bringing out a new edition of Chamberlin's *The Russian Revolution*. Seventeen years have elapsed since it was published in 1935 and today one can say with assurance that it is still by far the best account of the great Russian upheaval in any language. Moreover, it is unlikely that a more au-

thoritative work on the subject could be written for some time to come, if ever. There are several reasons for this situation. First of all, a good number of the source materials which the author had used are no longer available to scholars. Many of the speeches and writings of Trotsky and of the Old Bolsheviks—Rykov, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and other lesser Communist heretics—were still available during the period 1922-1933 when Mr. Chamberlin was working on his history in Moscow but have long since been either destroyed or withdrawn from circulation by Soviet censorship. The same situation prevails with regard to the material obtained from the Russian Foreign Archives in Prague; a substantial part of this Archive had been turned over by the Czech government to the Soviet Union in 1945 and presumably is lost to scholarship.

The definitive character of Chamberlin's history is derived also from the special qualifications of the author and the circumstances under which the material was gathered. In this work the author displays extensive knowledge of Russian culture and history, careful scholarship, unusual impartiality, and the easy-flowing style of a professional journalist. The balanced and epic sweep of his narrative is admirably suited to his subject. The most valuable parts of his work, from an historical standpoint, are perhaps his excellent analyses of the military campaigns during the Civil War and his shrewd interpretations of the major political figures from Lenin to Miliukov.

Chamberlin approaches the Russian Revolution from a detached, pluralistic, and broadly humanistic viewpoint. There is no trace of

special pleading, nor are the events and personalities described interpreted from the viewpoint of some definite philosophy of history, as is the case with the recently published and comparable work on the Russian Revolution by Edward Carr, whose approach consistently is that of an historical determinist.

Carr's three-volume *History of the Russian Revolution*, of which two volumes have already appeared, offers other points of comparison with Chamberlin's history. Carr's work is largely a formal analysis of "the political, social and the economic order which emerged from the Revolution." His emphasis is, therefore, largely on the institutional side of War Communism. Chamberlin's history on the other hand is a comprehensive record of events with the emphasis on the Civil War. In general, Carr's source material is far less diversified than is Chamberlin's.

There is still another fortunate aspect of Chamberlin's history. The author was residing in Russia as foreign correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor* from 1922 to 1933 and was able to talk personally to some of the leading actors in the events he describes. This imparts to his history a living, realistic quality which is apt to be absent from works of formal academic character.

The text of the new edition is unchanged. In the introduction to the new edition Chamberlin states that his history was written as a chronological record and "it seemed inadvisable to alter this record in any way because of shifts in international political conditions and in the climate of public opinion." Moreover, it would appear that no sufficiently important new material has come to light since publication of the

first edition to justify extensive revisions of either the factual record or the author's interpretations.

While Chamberlin's conclusions relating to major aspects of the great Russian upheaval, its causes, its leadership, its significance in Russian and universal history, are likely to stand the test of time, on several points legitimate questions might be raised.

First of all, the forces that worked for a peaceful solution of Russia's internal problems in the years preceding World War I have not been sufficiently brought out. Chamberlin underestimates, I think, the many progressive developments during the Constitutional régime—in industry, agriculture, and elementary education—for which the Third and to some extent the Fourth Dumas were partially responsible. While it may be true that, by Western standards, the Dumas were not very representative in character and have failed to arouse marked enthusiasm of the masses, for Russia they were important as the first free tribunes and schools of democratic processes. To make the Duma more effective, Russia needed more time, and that was not granted.

Chamberlin dismisses too lightly, I think, the assistance rendered to the Bolsheviks by the German High Command. The so-called Edgar Sisson's "documents," the majority of which (53 out of 68) were adjudged by an impartial committee of scholars to have been genuine, are not even mentioned. The whole question of German-Bolshevik relations of that period needs further investigation and appraisal.

It is generally accepted by historians that the control of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets passed into Bolshevik hands in

September, 1917, but it is by no means clear whether the majority of the Soviets throughout the country favored the Bolsheviks at the time. If this were so, how to account for the anti-Bolshevik majority (75% of the vote) at the elections to the Constituent Assembly in January, 1918? This point, too, deserves further study and elaboration.

In describing, with admirable impartiality, the brutality of the Red and White Terror, Chamberlin should have brought out a significant point of difference between them. It is important to know that Red Terror started *before* the Civil War actually got under way (the Cheka was established December 20, 1917) and that it was an *integral* part of the totalitarian system established by Lenin. White Terror, on the other hand, was largely the abuse of power by individual officers and agents of the White armies; it was never proclaimed as an official policy by the heads of the White governments.

In describing the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, Chamberlin states that the course of the Revolution "clearly indicated that the idea which the Romanovs incarnated, the idea of autocratic sovereignty, was dead so far as the Russian masses were concerned" (Vol. II, page 95). Certainly, no strong popular movement among the peasants has developed for the restoration of the Tsar. Yet, curiously enough, 32 years later from post-World War II Soviet refugees (of peasant stock) one often hears the view expressed that the restoration of the monarchy, following some future upset of the Communist régime, is both possible and desirable.

The above observations do not, of course, detract from the exceptional historical value of Chamberlin's history. His account of the greatest social upheaval of our time deserves, I think, to be ranked among the best examples of contemporary historical writing.

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MAZOUR, ANATOLE G. *Russia: Past and Present*. New York, Van Nostrand, 1951. 785 pp. Text \$6.50. Trade \$9.00.

Russian history is still a relatively neglected subject in this country, and the publication of a one-volume history with a fresh approach to the problem of presenting this complex body of material is a major event in this field. The significance of Mazour's new volume lies both in his attempt to combine a topical with a chronological narrative and in his somewhat special interpretation of the course of Russian history.

Somewhat over one-half of the volume is devoted to a topical account of the background of contemporary Russia to 1914. These chapters include, in addition to introductory material on the land, the people, and a brief general interpretation, two chapters each on the church, the state, foreign affairs, economic development, the humanities, the revolutionary tradition, and the revolutionary movements of 1905-14. Each pair of topical chapters is organized as an independent essay, with the emphasis on the Muscovite period in the chapters on the church and the state, and in the case of the other topics on the nineteenth century.

For the period after 1914, to which almost one-half the volume is devoted, the author's narrative is chronological. This type of organization has much to recommend it. In classroom use, experience with this volume has tended to show that students welcome a rapid summary of political developments from the ninth to the twentieth centuries, before settling down to a topical survey of Russian institutions and developments. If lectures and collateral reading are adapted to this text, this approach can be of real assistance in teaching those features of Russian history which appear tedious to many beginners.

At the same time the topical approach has some serious disadvantages. Probably the most significant of these is that the artificial separation of related events in a historical period makes it difficult to perceive the interrelations which are fundamental to an understanding of history. In the case of the reign of Peter the Great, for instance, Mazour describes the establishment of the Holy Synod on pages 67-68, discusses the political reforms—with further brief mention of the Holy Synod—on pages 85-90, and then takes up foreign affairs on pages 118-21, and industrial development on pages 189-90. This is a fair example of the problems raised by the topical approach. Under this plan some repetition is of course inevitable, but in certain instances it seems to have been carried to unnecessary lengths.

Implicit in the organization of this volume, which takes World War I as the boundary between "past" and "present," is Mazour's interpretation of Russian history. It is his view that Russia has become a world power only recently

as a result of its industrialization, and to this late arrival he attributes what he refers to as the "cultural immaturity" of Russia in the nineteenth century and the "adolescent instability" of Soviet nationalism. This interpretation provides only a general framework for the volume which in no sense dominates the narrative, and it presumably justifies the devotion of so much attention to the Soviet period.

In treating the Soviet period Mazour is strong on factual detail and rather weak on analysis. The impression is given that Soviet policies have resulted in rapid economic development in all fields, and few questions are raised as to the actual accomplishments of collectivization, the trend of the standard of living, or the relationship of the Soviet program to the Marxist philosophy. In the political field such controversial matters as the purges of the 1930's and the compulsory labor camps receive only the briefest mention, and there is little probing of Soviet policies either in relation to the Russian tradition or in more abstract terms. Moreover, the very organization of the volume is such that only the Soviet period stands out as an integrated historical unit, and it is difficult for the reader to evaluate the rôle of the perhaps equally revolutionary period of 1861-1914 in the building of a modern Russia. By tailoring his history to the current interest in contemporary Russia, Mazour has thus in some measure sacrificed the freedom of the reader to explore interpretations other than that which gives the Soviet régime principal credit for Russia's present position as a world power.

Another feature of this interpre-

tation is a warm espousal of the Russian national viewpoint which sets the tone for certain sections of the narrative. Early in the volume Mazour asserts that western Europe advanced more rapidly because it was "shielded by Russia" (p. 24), and refers to western society as "the suicidal competitive system with its laissez-faire philosophy which the western man accepts axiomatically" (p. 25). Later, in evaluating the reforms of Peter the Great, Mazour recognizes that they may have been a historical necessity but regrets that they "imposed crucial readjustments and an unbearable price for the privilege of joining the western European family of nations" (p. 90). Similarly in matters of foreign policy Mazour's interpretation tends to become noticeably one-sided as the narrative approaches recent events, and in discussing Soviet foreign policy since 1945 he occasionally introduces a polemical tone.

While this volume is thus not without its idiosyncrasies, it has much to offer as an introductory text. The special emphasis on the Soviet period may run counter to the preferences of many teachers, but there is undoubtedly room for a text with this approach. In any case it is certain to stimulate discussion among students and to arouse their curiosity concerning Russia.

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ZAVALANI, T. *How Strong Is Russia?*
New York; Frederick A. Praeger,
1952. 244 pp. \$4.00.

Mr. Zavalani, a Communist in his youth, was in the Soviet Union dur-

ing the last of the NEP and the beginning of the First Five Year Plan. At that time he shared in the enthusiasm generated for and by the Plan, and shared also in the hopes, schemes, and labors of the Comintern. But he left the USSR in 1930 and forsook the Communist Party in 1932. His attitude toward Soviet planning changed from sympathy to mistrust and then to "horrified disgust." This book is, to paraphrase his words, an attempt to substantiate his change of opinion by facts and figures from Soviet sources. It is a successful attempt.

Mr. Zavalani's technique, and it is very effective, is to contrast plans and claims with reality. Since he generally quotes both claims and the realistic record from Soviet sources, he makes it very difficult for the comrades to answer his arguments. How, for example, can one reconcile the boast of the "gigantic step forward" taken by Soviet agriculture with the facts that the total cultivated area in 1933 was five per cent less than it had been in 1931, and that the grain yield per hectare in 1933 was only 8.9 as compared to 8.4 in 1913? Or how does one reconcile the official promise that no new paper money would be printed in 1931 with the fact that between July and September of that year "currency circulation was increased by 1.4 billion roubles"? Or how does one reconcile the boast that "The causes that give rise to the exploitation of man by man and the division of society into exploiters and exploited have been completely eliminated . . ." with the facts of slave labor? These and many other irreconcilable contradictions are skillfully pointed out by Zavalani as he examines Soviet economic development from 1928 to 1950.

His analyses of Stakhanovism and of the meaning of Soviet planning to Soviet workers are especially good.

Mr. Zavalani concludes that: "They [the Soviets] have not created the highly rational, efficient, progressive and fair economic system promised by Lenin. In other words, Marxism, based on the collective ownership of *all* (sic) the means of production, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the permanent revolution, has not been an answer to the economic and social problems of our century. "... They [the Politburo] are using disruption, diversion, blackmail, kidnapping and other gangster methods in order to bring about the accomplishment of the 'Marxist laws of history' which are being by-passed by real life in the free world."

A few adverse criticisms ought to be noted; some of them directed against the publisher rather than against the author. The first criticism is that the title is misleading. The book does not, except to a very limited degree, attempt to answer the question posed by the title, and certainly it is not a study of current Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Over half the book is devoted to the period from 1928 to 1945. The last ninety pages deal with the Fourth Five Year Plan and with post-war developments.

The second criticism is that although the work is well documented from Soviet sources, Mr. Zavalani has apparently made little use of available English-language materials and none at all of the many available works by American scholars except those whose books were published in Britain.

The third negative feature is the gross over-pricing of the book. The

book was printed in Great Britain where printing costs are much lower than they are here. Surely the costs of binding and distribution were not so great as to warrant a price of \$4.00. Other American houses have published British-printed books of comparable size for approximately a dollar less. My plaint is not that the publisher may make too much money, but that the price will keep many who ought to have this book from buying it.

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SCHWARTZ, BENJAMIN I. *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*. Cambridge, Harvard University, 1951. 258 pp. \$4.00.

The general reader will not find this book too rewarding, but students of Far Eastern affairs will find its information-packed pages both stimulating and provocative.

Actually, the author has chosen to restrict his treatment of Chinese Communism largely to an examination of how the movement is related to the Marxist-Leninist *scolastique* (p. 4). Having addressed himself to this task, Mr. Schwartz proceeds to trace the pattern of the major Chinese Communist schools of thought from the inception of the movement to the time when Mao Tse-tung emerged as dominant leader of his Party. In accomplishing his objective, the author has demonstrated a brand of scholarship which is as commendable as it is rare in these days when impressionistic writing seems to be the vogue.

For some Far Eastern scholars, the approach taken by the author

may seem disappointingly circumscribed and, at times, unrealistic. They may feel that the specially ground lenses furnished by Mr. Schwartz for the close study of permutations in doctrinaire Chinese Communism may not be fully adequate in gaining a well rounded appreciation of the movement in terms of its widely diverse and highly complex motivations.

While deeply appreciative of the distinguished scholarship which the author has so convincingly displayed, this reviewer feels a tinge of regret that the study was not designed toward a closer orientation to political and cultural forces with which Communism had to contend. It would be grossly unfair to insist that the author has completely ignored the *milieu* which provided sustenance to Communist doctrine. He does concede that Ch'en Tui-hsiu felt "the influence of that very Confucian tradition which he had so emphatically repudiated" (p. 33). It may very well be true that the effect of certain strains of traditional Chinese thought was somewhat stronger than the author has indicated. If this were true, it would not be readily apparent from an examination of the literal text of Communist writings which, by intention, are directed toward the discrediting of ancient forms of thinking. However, a complete divorce from a cultural heritage as rich as China's is scarcely possible—even when aided by the rigid disciplines which Communism imposes.

The author has throughout the entire book succeeded admirably in describing the kaleidoscopic power shifts which elevated one leader after another to a position of temporary dominance. Much was done to discredit the opposition by

denunciatory charges of heretical involvement. Some evidence of the use of this tactic is evident in the bitter attacks directed against Li Li-san by his enemies and most notably the "Returned Student Clique" (pp. 162-163).

In the first eleven chapters, the story of conflicting interpretations of traditional Communist doctrine is recounted with painstaking attention to detail. The coverage includes the names of all prominent leaders, both foreign and Chinese, as well as mentioning many others with lesser claim to fame. It is interesting to note the rôle which Mao played during the decade prior to his assumption of undisputed Party leadership. His ability to survive was in itself a notable achievement and his political acumen in handling such a thorny problem as the relationship of military to civilian control gives one index to his intuitive skill in making correct decisions. Thus in the Mao-Chu partnership, it was Mao who was always recognized as exercising preeminent authority (p. 173).

With complete adherence to the "Leninist formula of a revolutionary elite allied to the motive power of mass discontent" (p. 85), Mao possessed an instrument to control the peasants. Thus it was Mao who dictated the party line and through an imposition of rigid discipline, he was assured that the "democratic" peasant assemblies would vote its acceptance. The question, therefore, which the author raises appears to be primarily one of whether Mao was strictly orthodox in his acceptance of Marxist formal theory (p. 191). There is the possibility that Mao may have always considered power as his primary objective and regarded theory as something flexible in terms of its practical

application. If true, the question of orthodoxy is relegated to a position of secondary significance.

Although the author does not "speak in tones of dogmatic finality," he does conclude "that the gravitation of power into the hands of Mao Tse-tung" was primarily due to indigenous forces at work in China rather than because "of any decision in Moscow" (p. 187). This point of view will be difficult for many thoughtful readers to accept until more exhaustive research on the problem has been accomplished. Undoubtedly, the interest taken by Moscow in events occurring in China fluctuated in intensity over the years and the abortive affairs at Canton and Changsha dampened Soviet enthusiasm. But in spite of it all, it is probably dangerous to discount, as Mr. Schwartz does, the real effectiveness and continued persistence of controls exerted by Moscow. As early as 1922, it was Maring who "invoked the authority of the Comintern" (p. 41). Throughout the entire book it is possible to detect the Kremlin using its "iron hand in the velvet glove." How else can the recall of Li Li-san to Moscow, and the "abject confessions of error" by Chou En-lai be explained? (p. 165).

It might well be that Mao was permitted considerable latitude in his selection of political tactics, but to assume that Moscow failed to appreciate the strategic position of China in furtherance of World Communism is indeed doubtful. Too much was at stake for the Kremlin to ever allow Chinese Communism to develop organizationally along lines of its own choosing. The satellite rôle which China would occupy according to the Communist *Weltanschauung* was pre-determined in Moscow and the writings and recent

speeches of Mao Tse-tung confirm the view that Chinese Communist solidarity with the U.S.S.R. is an actuality.

The contribution which Mr. Schwartz has already made to an understanding of one aspect of Chinese Communism is so substantial that Far Eastern scholars must acknowledge a debt of gratitude to him. They can only hope that much more will be forthcoming from his brilliant pen.

WILFRED J. SMITH

Air War College

TYRKOVA-WILLIAMS, A. *Na putiakh k svobode* (On the Road to Freedom). New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1952. 429 pp. \$3.00.

What gives the present book its value is first of all the blow it deals to the erroneous idea that the Russian people never cared and never strove for freedom, that they have always meekly submitted to despotism. Russian political and social history since the eighteenth century is largely the story of a tireless struggle of the educated class against the tsarist régime. The author depicts the struggle of her generation for freedom and shows us why it failed. It should be remembered, however, that at no time and in no country has the road to freedom been straight and easy.

Wherein lay the weakness, the inadequacy of the first elected representatives of the Russian people? Weren't they the flower of the intelligentsia, the true élite of the nation? Tyrkova-Williams portrays them vividly and with a masterly hand, showing up both the high qualities and the shortcomings of the

Russian intelligentsia's national character: their fervent idealism and their practical inefficiency. In eloquent speeches the deputies to the First Duma developed grandiose radical and progressive ideas; and yet they not only lacked any actual administrative experience—they were hardly aware of its necessity and importance. The tsarist government suffered from the opposite failing. While it possessed abundant administrative experience, it was utterly indifferent and even hostile to ideas of a radical and progressive kind.

The author forcefully presents the tragic dilemma: while the country sorely needed cooperation between the government and the young parliament, this proved impossible from the very first. The intelligentsia, stubborn in its opposition, did nothing but denounce the government, and actually it hardly knew how to do anything else. Both sides were to blame; each side saw and despised the failings of the other and neither understood nor respected the other's merits. The author is certainly justified in emphasizing the utter inability of the opposition to appreciate the value of the immense store of practical experience accumulated by the tsarist government since Peter the Great. It was the fundamental sin of the intelligentsia that it failed to understand the positive rôle of conservatism in political and social life. Never did it think of itself as "His Majesty's opposition"; on the other hand, "His Majesty" never realized the need for an opposition. This, however, is not exclusively a Russian sin; only Great Britain and the United States are free of it.

Another merit of this book of reminiscences is that it does away with the myth which represents

the tsarist government as a kind of totalitarian tyranny. Russia's present régime is such a tyranny. Stalin once said: "We too have an opposition, but it is in jail." In the patriarchal monarchy, on the contrary, the opposition was at large; in fact most of the Russian intelligentsia and most of Russian literature were in opposition to the régime. The opposition, it is true, had no legal rights, but it enjoyed full freedom in daily life. Lenin in his Siberian exile lived unmolested, went hunting, received foreign periodicals, worked out his Marxist theories. And after his escape abroad he lived on the pension of his mother-in-law punctually mailed to him by the Imperial government. Generally speaking, revolutionaries used to escape abroad with amazing facility, witness Tyrkova-Williams' own experience. There certainly was no iron curtain in pre-Bolshevik Russia.

The book has outstanding historical value and is written by a masterly hand, with every literary means at her disposal. Similar memoirs relating to the epoch-making French Revolution became invaluable material for later historians. The Russian Revolution likewise marks a turn in world history, and acquaintance with the first act of the great drama should be of importance to the rest of the world. A translation of the book is, therefore, most desirable. It is regrettable that the book ends abruptly after the curtain has gone down on the first act, leaving us with the desire to learn how the author would present and evaluate the later unfolding of the drama of which "God had made her witness."

B. P. VYCHESLAVZEFF

Geneva, Switzerland

Index to Volume 11

(January–October 1952)

(Reviews are entered under the author of the book and under reviewer.)

	No.	Page
Adams, Arthur E.: Pobedonostsev's Thought Control	4	241
Altschuler, Gregory: <i>Tsar i doktor</i> . Rev. by Valentine Tscherbotarioff Bill	1	59
American View of Bloody Sunday, An. William C. Askew	1	35
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish: <i>Tito and Goliath</i> . Rev. by Bertram D. Wolfe	2	118
Aronson, Gregor: The Tragedy of the Cosmopolite Tairov	3	148
Askew, William C.: An American View of Bloody Sunday	1	35
Belousovitch, Igor N.: S. B. Okun's <i>The Russian-American Company</i> . Trans. by C. Ginsburg	3	174
Benns, F. Lee: M. Einaudi, J.-M. Domenach, and A. Garosci's <i>Communism in Western Europe</i> ; Y. Gluckstein's <i>Stalin's Satellites in Europe</i>	4	247
Berberova, Nina: Vladislav Khodasevich—a Russian Poet	2	78
Berg, L. S.: <i>Natural Regions of the USSR</i> . Trans. by O. A. Titlebaum; ed. by J. A. Morrison and C. C. Nikiforoff. Rev. by Bogdan Zaborski	2	121
Bilainkin, George: <i>Tito</i> . Rev. by Bertram D. Wolfe	2	118
Bill, Valentine Tscherbotarioff: Gregory Altschuler's <i>Tsar i doktor</i> ; Gleb Struve's <i>Russkii evropeets</i>	1	59
Black, C. E.: A. G. Mazour's <i>Russia, Past and Present</i>	4	252
Blinoff, Marthe: Nadeida Gorodetzky's <i>Saint Tikhon Zadonsky, Inspirer of Dostoevsky</i>	3	175
Book Notices	1	61
Book Notices	2	127
Books, Pamphlets and Articles on Russia Published in 1951. Bibliography	3	177
Carman, E. Day: <i>Russia's Drive Toward World Domination</i> . Rev. by Max M. Laserson	2	120
Celmins, Gustav: Albert K. Herling's <i>The Soviet Slave Empire</i>	1	56
Chamberlin, William Henry: Russian and American Civil Wars. —Russians Against Stalin	4	203
— <i>The Russian Revolution</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	1	16
Claims and Realities of Soviet Socialism. George C. Guins	4	250
Dailey, Kenneth I.: Max M. Laserson's <i>The American Impact on Russia</i>	3	138
Do the Russians Hate America? Mikhail Koriakov	1	57
Domenach, J.-M. (with M. Einaudi and A. Garosci): <i>Communism in Western Europe</i> . Rev. by F. Lee Benns	1	3
Dvoichenko-Markov, Eufrosina: John Ledyard and the Russians	4	247
	4	211

	No.	Page
Einaudi, M. (with J.-M. Domenach and A. Garosci): <i>Communism in Western Europe</i> . Rev. by F. Lee Bennis.....	4	247
Ezhov's Régime. II. R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik.....	1	44
Ezhov's Régime. III. R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik.....	2	106
Garosci, A. (with M. Einaudi and J.-M. Domenach): <i>Communism in Western Europe</i> . Rev. by F. Lee Bennis.....	4	247
Gerschenkron, Alexander: <i>A Dollar Index of Soviet Machinery Output, 1927/28 to 1937</i> . Rev. by Holland Hunter.....	3	173
Gibian, George: Shakespeare in Soviet Russia.....	1	24
Gluckstein, Y.: <i>Stalin's Satellites in Europe</i> . Rev. by F. Lee Bennis.....	4	247
Gorodetzky, Nadejda: <i>Saint Tikhon Zadonsky, Inspirer of Dostoevsky</i> . Rev. by Marthe Blinoff.....	3	175
Guins, George C.: Claims and Realities of Soviet Socialism.....	3	138
Herling, Albert K.: <i>The Soviet Slave Empire</i> . Rev. by Gustav Celmins.....	1	56
Hunter, Holland: Alexander Gerschenkron's <i>A Dollar Index of Soviet Machinery Output, 1927/28 to 1937</i>	3	173
Ivanov-Razumnik, R. V.: Ezhov's Régime. II.....	1	44
—Ezhov's Régime. III.....	2	106
Jorré, George: <i>The Soviet Union; The Land and Its People</i> . Trans. by E. D. Laborde. Rev. by Harry Schwartz.....	2	124
Kasperek, Jiri: Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia's Uranium....	2	97
Katkov, M. N.—A Reactionary Liberal. Marc Raeff.....	3	157
Kheraskov, Ivan: Reminiscences of the Moscow Students' Movement.....	4	223
Khodasevich, Vladislav—a Russian Poet. Nina Berberova....	2	78
Kohn, Hans: Lothar Schultz's <i>Russische Rechtsgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart Einschliesslich des Rechts der Sowiet Union</i>	2	125
Koriakov, Mikhail: Do the Russians Hate America?.....	1	3
Kucherov, Samuel: The Case of Vera Zasulich.....	2	86
Laserson, Max M.: <i>The American Impact on Russia</i> . Rev. by Kenneth I. Dailey.....	1	57
—E. Day Carman's <i>Russia's Drive Toward World Domination</i> ...	2	120
Ledyard, John, and the Russians. Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov.....	4	211
Lenin, New Light on. David Shub.....	3	131
Lenin: Prophet of World Revolution from the East. Stanley W. Page.....	2	67
Matthews, W. K.: <i>Languages of the U.S.S.R.</i> Rev. by Lew R. Micklesen.....	1	58
Mazour, A. G.: <i>Russia, Past and Present</i> . Rev. by C. E. Black..	4	252
Mead, Margaret: <i>Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority</i> . Rev. by Vladimir Petrov.....	3	171
Micklesen, Lew R.: W. K. Matthews' <i>Languages of the U.S.S.R.</i>	1	58
Moscow Students' Movement, The Reminiscences of. Ivan Kheraskov.....	4	223

	No.	Page
Okun, S. B.: <i>The Russian-American Company</i> . Trans. by C. Ginsburg. Rev. by Igor N. Belousovitch	3	174
Page, Stanley W.: <i>Lenin: Prophet of World Revolution from the East</i>	2	67
Petrov, Vladimir: Margaret Mead's <i>Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority</i>	3	171
Pobedonostsev's <i>Thought Control</i> . Arthur E. Adams	4	241
Raeff, Marc: <i>A Reactionary Liberal</i> : M. N. Katkov	3	157
Russian and American Civil Wars. William Henry Chamberlin	4	203
Russians Against Stalin. William Henry Chamberlin	1	16
Schultz, Lothar: <i>Russische Rechtsgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart Einschliesslich des Rechts der Sowiet Union</i> . Rev. by Hans Kohn	2	125
Schwartz, B. I.: <i>Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao</i> . Rev. by Wilfred J. Smith	4	255
Schwartz, Harry: George Joré's <i>The Soviet Union; The Land and Its People</i> . Trans. by E. D. Laborde	2	124
Schwartz, Solomon M.: <i>The Jews in the Soviet Union</i> . Rev. by Samson Soloveitchik	3	168
Shakespeare in Soviet Russia. George Gibian	1	24
Shub, David: <i>New Light on Lenin</i>	3	131
Smith, Wilfred J.: B. I. Schwartz' <i>Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao</i>	4	255
Soloveitchik, Samson: Solomon M. Schwartz' <i>The Jews in the Soviet Union</i>	3	168
Soviet Jurisprudence Since World War II. N. S. Timasheff	4	233
Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia's Uranium. Jiri Kasperek	2	97
Struve, Gleb: <i>Russkii evropeets</i> . Rev. by Valentine Tscherbotarioff Bill	1	59
Tairov, <i>Tragedy of the Cosmopolite</i> . Gregor Aronson	3	148
Timasheff, N. S.: <i>Soviet Jurisprudence Since World War II</i>	4	233
Tyrkova-Williams, A.: <i>Na putiakh k svobode</i> (On the Road to Freedom). Rev. by B. P. Vycheslavzeff	4	257
von Mohrenschildt, Dimitri: William Henry Chamberlin's <i>The Russian Revolution</i>	4	250
Vycheslavzeff, B. P.: A. Tyrkova-Williams' <i>Na putiakh k svobode</i> (On the Road to Freedom)	4	257
Walsh, Warren B.: T. Zavalani's <i>How Strong is Russia?</i>	4	254
White, Leigh: <i>Balkan Caesar</i> . Rev. by Bertram D. Wolfe	2	118
Wolfe, Bertram D.: Hamilton Fish Armstrong's <i>Tito and Goliath</i> ; Leigh White's <i>Balkan Caesar</i> ; George Bilainkin's <i>Tito</i>	2	118
Zaborski, Bogdan: L. S. Berg's <i>Natural Regions of the USSR</i> . Trans. by O. A. Titlebaum; ed. by J. A. Morrison and C. Nikiforoff	2	121
Zasulich, Vera— <i>The Case of</i> . Samuel Kucherov	2	86
Zavalani, T.: <i>How Strong is Russia?</i> Rev. by Warren B. Walsh	4	254

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
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Russia and the Holy Land	W. Baczkowski
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
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*An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia
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Vol. 12

JANUARY 1953

No. 1

★ ★ ★

The Trojan Dove, <i>Peter Viereck</i>	3
Alexander Blok, <i>Helen Muchnic</i>	16
The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Comintern, 1933-1935, <i>Robert P. Browder</i>	25
From Pushkin's Poems (translations), <i>Boris Brasol</i>	40
Peter Struve's Escape from Soviet Russia, <i>Arkady Borman</i>	42

BOOK REVIEWS

The New Man in Soviet Psychology, <i>by</i> Raymond A. Bauer, <i>William H. Ittelson</i>	51
Soviet Legal Philosophy, <i>by</i> V. I. Lenin, P. I. Stuchka, M. A. Reisner, E. G. Pashukanis, etc., <i>George C. Guins</i>	52
The Soviet Financial System: Its Development and Relations with the Western World, <i>by</i> Mikhail V. Condoide, <i>Earl R. Sikes</i>	54

Continued on Page II

Russia: A History, <i>by</i> Sidney Harcave, <i>Donald W. Treadgold</i> . .	54
History of Latvia, an Outline, <i>by</i> Arnolds Spekke, <i>C. Leonard Lundin</i>	56
Neizdannyy Gumilyov, <i>by</i> G. P. Struve (ed.), <i>Leonid I. Strakhovsky</i>	58
<hr/>	
Book Notices	60

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

*An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

Vol. 12

APRIL 1953

No. 2

★ ★ ★

The Soviet Campaign Against "Survivals of Capitalism," <i>Abraham Brumberg</i>	65
George Fedotov, <i>George Ivask</i>	79
The Fate of Empires, <i>George Fedotov</i>	83
Boris Zaitsev—the Humanist, <i>Leonid I. Strakhovsky</i>	95
Equality of Rights of the Soviet Nationalities, <i>Casimir C. Gecys</i>	100
Russian Area Studies and Research Since World War II, <i>Dimitri von Mohrenschildt</i>	111

BOOK REVIEWS

Stalin, <i>by Nikolaus Basseches</i> ; The Life and Death of Stalin, <i>by Louis Fischer, Warren B. Walsh</i>	120
The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era; The Soviet Price System; Soviet Prices of Producers' Goods, <i>by Naum Jasny, Holland Hunter</i>	121

Continued on Page II

The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, <i>by</i> John S. Reshetar, Jr., <i>Kenneth I. Dailey</i>	123
A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, <i>by</i> Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, John K. Fairbank, <i>Wilfred</i> <i>J. Smith</i>	125
Chekhov the Dramatist, <i>by</i> David Magarshack, <i>Charles W.</i> <i>Meister</i>	126
<hr/>	
Michael I. Rostovtzeff, 1870-1952, <i>C. Bradford Welles</i>	128
Letter to the Editor	134

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Editor

Michael Karpovich

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

*An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

Vol. 12

JULY 1953

No. 3

★ ★ ★

Ten Fallacies About Communism, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i> ..	139
The Soviet Succession: Lenin and Stalin, <i>Robert V. Daniels</i>	153
The Cadet Party, <i>A. Tyrkova-Williams</i>	173
Stolypin in Saratov, <i>Mary Stolypin Bock</i>	187

BOOK REVIEWS

The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. II, <i>by E. H. Carr, Richard E. Pipes</i>	194
The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914, <i>by Hugh Seton-Watson, Warren B. Walsh</i>	195
A History of Latvia, <i>by Alfred Bilmanis, Gustavs Celmins</i>	196
Seven Britons in Imperial Russia, <i>ed. by Peter Putnam, Kenneth I. Dailey</i>	198
Novyi grad, <i>by G. P. Fedotov, B. P. Vysheslavitsev</i>	199

Continued on Page II

Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals, <i>by</i> Peter Viereck, <i>René Fueleop-Miller</i>	201
Book Notices	203

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books, Pamphlets, and Articles on Russia Published in 1952, <i>Virginia L. Close</i>	206
---	-----

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Editor

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia
Past and Present

Vol. 12

OCTOBER 1953

No. 4

★ ★ ★

Kropotkin and Lenin, <i>David Shub</i>	227
The Kornilov Affair, <i>Abraham Ascher</i>	235
O. Henry in Russia, <i>Deming Brown</i>	253
Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai, <i>C. Bickford O'Brien</i>	259
The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., <i>George C. Guins</i>	269

BOOK REVIEWS

Russia and Her Colonies, <i>by Walter Kolarz, John S. Reshetar, Jr.</i>	279
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, <i>ed. by Jane Degras, Donald G. Bishop</i>	280
Minerals—A Key to Soviet Power, <i>by Demitri B. Shimkin, Harry Schwartz</i>	283

Continued on Page II

Der Dialektische Materialismus, Seine Geschichte und Sein System in der Sowjetunion, <i>by</i> Gustav A. Wetter, <i>Hans Kohn</i>	283
Moscow and East Rome. A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia, <i>by</i> William K. Medlin, <i>Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill</i>	285
Monachisme et Monastères Russes, <i>by</i> M. J. Rouët de Journal, <i>N. Bock</i>	286
Freedom and the Tragic Life; A Study in Dostoevsky, <i>by</i> Vyacheslav Ivanov, <i>René Fueloep-Miller</i>	288

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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